First digital bridge beneath Caspian Sea: How Sumqayit-Aktau cable reshapes Eurasia's geostrategic landscape
Sumqayit-Aktau cable reshapes Eurasia
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have completed a key milestone in the implementation of a Caspian Sea project, with the subsea section of the Sumqayit-Aktau Trans-Caspian fibre-optic cable now in place.
The roughly 380-km line is the first fibre-optic infrastructure to be laid on the bed of the Caspian Sea. With a capacity of more than 400 Tbps, the system is being developed by AzerTelecom International and Kazakhtelecom through their joint venture, CaspiLink B.V. The project is being financed entirely by the operators, without any state budget funding.
Offshore works began in July and were completed in early August. The connection of the onshore infrastructure and system testing are scheduled for the autumn, while commercial operations are expected to begin by the end of 2026. The project is more than a technical achievement. As one of the flagship components of Azerbaijan’s Digital Silk Way initiative, it strengthens the digital dimension of the Middle Corridor and has the potential to reshape regional data flows.
Technical and organisational aspects
The capacity of the fibre-optic cable significantly exceeds that of the existing terrestrial routes in the region. This provides the foundation for transmitting large volumes of data and supporting the development of cloud services and future artificial intelligence infrastructure.
The project is being implemented by AzerTelecom International, part of NEQSOL Holding, and Kazakhtelecom through an equal partnership under their joint venture, CaspiLink B.V. Registered in the Netherlands, the company is responsible for both the construction and future operation of the cable. The project is financed entirely with private funds, reducing its exposure to the political and bureaucratic risks associated with state funding. At the same time, its long-term success will depend on the commercial viability of the operators and the stability of the regional political environment.
Laying the cable along the Caspian seabed presented significant technical challenges, as no such operation had previously been carried out there. The route was designed to avoid anchorage areas and military exercise zones. Engineering surveys and environmental approvals were completed in 2025.
The cable was manufactured and tested in China before being shipped to Baku via Kazakhstan’s Kuryk port. Installation was carried out around the clock using a specialised vessel with a displacement of more than 20,000 tonnes. Around 70 specialists took part in the operation. The next phase will involve integrating the onshore landing stations and conducting system tests.
Although commercial operations are scheduled to begin by the end of 2026, the cable’s actual utilisation rates and transit volumes are unlikely to become clear before 2027.
Can Caspian cable provide alternative to Russia and Red Sea routes?
The answer is: to some extent, yes, but not entirely. At present, internet traffic from Central Asia and the South Caucasus largely relies on two main routes: via Russian networks to the north and via the subsea cable systems in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean to the south. In recent years, both have faced geopolitical and infrastructure-related risks, including sanctions, cable damage and network congestion. The Trans-Caspian cable helps reduce this dependence by creating an alternative route that bypasses Russia and Iran, connecting Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, or linking eastwards through Kazakhstan to China.
Its impact, however, is unlikely to be immediate or comprehensive. The cable covers only the Aktau-Sumqayit section of the route. A fully functioning digital corridor will also require sufficient terrestrial network capacity in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan, a well-developed network of data centres, and commercial agreements between telecom operators.
From a latency perspective, the Caspian route appears competitive. According to available data, round-trip signal latency between the two shores is around 3.7 milliseconds. However, the extent to which it strengthens digital sovereignty will depend on whether substantial volumes of traffic are rerouted through the new link and whether regional operators gain greater control over traffic routing.
For Central Asian states, the project offers an opportunity to reduce, at least partially, their dependence on Russian transit infrastructure. For the South Caucasus, it strengthens the region’s position as an emerging digital hub. Full digital independence, however, remains a distant prospect, as a significant share of traffic handled by major providers, as well as data flows between China and Europe, will continue to rely on established routes.
Synergy between Middle Corridor and Digital Silk Way
Combining freight transport and digital infrastructure within a single geographic corridor offers practical advantages. The Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, has seen container traffic grow in recent years but continues to face constraints in competing with routes through Russia and other alternative corridors.
Adding a digital dimension makes the corridor more technologically advanced by enabling real-time transmission of logistics data, digitalising customs and border procedures, and accelerating insurance and financial transactions. Azerbaijan’s ambition to become a regional digital hub is closely linked to this synergy. Complementing existing energy pipelines, railways and seaports, the fibre-optic cable enhances the country’s appeal as a transit hub for data flows.
A realistic assessment, however, is warranted. Although Azerbaijan’s geographical location is advantageous, becoming a fully fledged digital hub will require large-scale data centres, affordable electricity, a highly skilled workforce and the presence of international cloud service providers. At present, these conditions have only been partially met. Strengthening terrestrial links with Georgia and Turkey, together with laying additional subsea cables across the Black Sea, would help unlock the full potential of the Digital Silk Way.
For Kazakhstan, further development of Aktau port and the modernisation of the country’s east-west digital infrastructure will be equally important. Ultimately, the benefits of this synergy will depend on both countries developing their respective infrastructure at a comparable pace.
Private funding model and risks
The advantages of delivering the project without state funding are clear. It reduces the risk of delays linked to political decision-making, places commercial incentives at the forefront and makes the project more transparent to international investors. CaspiLink B.V.’s registration in the Netherlands also provides greater legal certainty and a well-established framework for dispute resolution. The main vulnerabilities of the model stem from the financial position of the operators themselves and their political connections.
AzerTelecom is part of NEQSOL Holding, a privately owned business group with significant regional influence. Kazakhtelecom, by contrast, is a telecommunications operator with close ties to the Kazakh state. This ownership structure helps balance political risk: it combines commercial flexibility with the prospect of state support if required. At the same time, political developments in either country, sanctions risks or sharp fluctuations in energy markets could affect the operators’ ability to finance future investment.
The project’s cost was previously estimated at around $50m. Private financing has helped keep investment at a manageable level. However, any future expansion – including a possible extension towards Turkmenistan or an increase in transmission capacity – is likely to require additional capital. Long-term transit agreements and cooperation with international telecommunications consortia will therefore be important in mitigating these risks.
Geopolitical context
For China, the project forms a practical component of the Digital Silk Way, helping diversify data flows between Central Asia and Europe. The cable was manufactured in China and supports Beijing’s broader efforts to expand digital connectivity across Eurasia. For Western countries, meanwhile, the digital dimension of the Middle Corridor is strategically significant as it offers an alternative route that bypasses Russia and Iran.
Against the backdrop of efforts to develop the Middle Corridor and establish new data links between Europe and Asia, the cable takes on added strategic importance. It does not pose direct competition to Russia. Over the longer term, however, reducing Central Asia’s reliance on Russian digital transit infrastructure could weaken Moscow’s influence in the region.
The project’s strategic significance is further enhanced by its parallel development alongside existing energy infrastructure. The Caspian region is already home to major oil and gas export routes, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor. Running along the same geographic axis, the fibre-optic cable effectively serves as an “information pipeline”.
This helps diversify the region’s infrastructure and reinforces its role not only as an energy exporter but also as a hub for data transit. At the same time, geopolitical tensions, unresolved issues related to the legal status and security of the Caspian, military activity and sanctions risks remain potential threats to both digital and energy infrastructure.
Prospects and limitations
A possible next step would be to extend the route towards Turkmenistan. A Sumqayit-Turkmenbashi link could become an important component of a fully fledged Digital Silk Way. Its implementation, however, is likely to depend on Ashgabat’s restrictive telecommunications policies and broader strategic priorities.
As data centres and artificial intelligence infrastructure expand, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan could benefit from relatively affordable electricity and favourable conditions for cooling equipment. More broadly, deeper regional integration will depend on agreements between telecom operators, transparent pricing and simpler cross-border procedures.
The project also faces a number of constraints. The Caspian Sea’s fragile environment, potential restrictions linked to military activity, reliance on Chinese equipment and ongoing consolidation in the global telecommunications market could all slow its development. In addition, the cable’s commercial success will ultimately depend on demand. Regional traffic alone may not be sufficient to utilise its full capacity, making it necessary to attract major international data flows.
