Who has gained most from Turkey’s political crisis: Özel, Kılıçdaroğlu or Erdoğan?

Crisis in Turkey’s opposition party

A decision by Ankara’s Regional Court of Appeal on 21 May has not only led to a change in leadership within Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, but has also triggered a new political crisis over the future of the Turkish opposition, the relationship between the judiciary and politics, and the country’s broader political direction.

Following the ruling, markets entered a period of turbulence, the CHP headquarters turned into a site of protests for several days, and police entered the building on 24 May.

Why did the court ruling trigger such a strong reaction?

On 21 May, the 36th Civil Chamber of Ankara’s Regional Court of Appeal declared the 38th congress of the Republican People’s Party, held on 4–5 November 2023, “absolutely null and void” (mutlak butlan). It was at that congress that Özgür Özel was elected party leader after defeating Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The court also invalidated the legal consequences of the party’s 21st extraordinary congress, held on 6 April 2025, and ruled that all decisions adopted after the 38th congress should be considered invalid.

As a result, Özel, members of the party leadership, the party council and the High Disciplinary Committee were temporarily removed from their positions. Kılıçdaroğlu and the party leadership that held office before November 2023 were temporarily reinstated until the ruling takes legal effect. Reports suggest the decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The political shock stemmed from the fact that the case involves Turkey’s main opposition party, which won 37.77% of the vote in the 2024 local elections and emerged as the country’s largest political force.

On 21 May, immediately after the ruling, Turkey’s benchmark stock index, BIST 100, fell sharply.

During the day, losses exceeded 6% for the main index and 8% for the banking index, prompting a temporary suspension of trading. The crisis therefore moved beyond an internal party dispute and came to be viewed as a risk to both political stability and the country’s economy.

The roots of the crisis trace back to the 2023 congress

The crisis began with the 38th congress of the Republican People’s Party, held on 4–5 November 2023. At the event, Özgür Özel defeated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, ending his 13-year leadership of the party.

Afterwards, Lütfü Savaş and several delegates filed legal complaints, arguing that the vote at the congress involved irregularities and material influence over participants.

At the same time, within a separate criminal investigation, prosecutors charged 12 people in June 2025 with “manipulating the vote”. Case documents listed Kılıçdaroğlu as the “victim”, while Lütfü Savaş appeared as the “complainant”.

Seeking to reduce the risk posed by the legal challenge, Özel’s team convened the party’s 21st extraordinary congress on 6 April 2025, where delegates re-elected him as party leader. CHP officials said the move aimed to prevent a possible scenario in which authorities could appoint an external administrator (kayyum).

On 24 October 2025, a lower court dismissed the main lawsuit concerning the 38th congress without examining the merits of the case, citing a “loss of subject matter”. The court rejected some of the combined claims related to the 21st extraordinary congress because of a lack of legal interest and on the grounds that the defendant was not recognised as a proper party to the proceedings.

However, Ankara’s Regional Court of Appeal overturned that decision, reconsidered the case on its merits and issued a ruling of “absolute nullity” (mutlak butlan) on 21 May.

The legal meaning of mutlak butlan has also become a subject of dispute

The court argued that if internal party elections and decisions were conducted in violation of the law, the issue goes beyond a technical error and instead concerns circumstances that call into question the legal validity of those decisions.

The ruling refers to Article 27 of the Turkish Code of Obligations, as well as principles of democracy and equality within political parties. The court placed particular emphasis on findings that delegates’ voting decisions had been influenced through material benefits, promises and interference with freedom of choice.

However, no full consensus exists within the legal community.

Constitutional lawyers Şule Özsoy Boyunsuz and Korkut Kanadoğlu argued in a 2025 blog post for Lexpera that disputes over elections at party congresses should primarily be examined under electoral law rather than in civil courts. In their view, allegations of bribing delegates or influencing them through promises should also not automatically be treated as classic cases of mutlak butlan.

The authors further argued that restoring a former party leader through a court ruling could undermine freedom of political organisation.

The dispute therefore extends beyond politics and has become a significant legal debate as well.

Two competing forms of legitimacy have emerged inside CHP

Özgür Özel and the leadership of the Republican People’s Party immediately rejected the court ruling. The party’s Ankara branch called on supporters to gather outside headquarters, where members organised round-the-clock monitoring.

At first, Özel said that “delegates at the congress brought us to this platform, and only they can remove us from it”. He later described the developments as “interference in politics through the courts”, before adding that even if the party were removed from the building, it would “continue its path to power in the streets”.

On 23 May, during a closed meeting of the parliamentary group, delegates re-elected Özel as head of the CHP faction in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, giving him 95 votes. Another 15 MPs expressed support while citing valid reasons for their absence. Özel said the position of 110 lawmakers had therefore become clear.

The vote highlighted a growing divide between judicial legitimacy and organisational legitimacy.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, meanwhile, adopted a markedly different position. In his first public statement, he said the court ruling should not become a source of division but rather an opportunity for renewed unity around CHP, urging all sides to remain calm and develop a common position.

He later congratulated Özel on his re-election as parliamentary faction leader and said CHP needed to return to its core principles and traditional political direction.

For Kılıçdaroğlu’s supporters, the central argument is that CHP cannot build new legitimacy without addressing what they describe as the “stain left by the 2023 congress”.

Özel’s supporters, by contrast, argue that attempts to alter the will of congress delegates through the courts amount to external interference in internal party affairs.

Who emerged as the main winner?

The short answer appears to be this: from a legal perspective, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu gained the advantage, as many experts in Turkey describe the law as an instrument of political power; from the perspective of political and emotional mobilisation, Özgür Özel strengthened his position; strategically, however, the greatest benefit may have gone to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Following the court ruling, Kılıçdaroğlu gained the advantages associated with official status, the party seal and formal leadership. At the same time, Özel’s camp managed to retain the support of a significant share of the parliamentary faction, the party apparatus and symbolic street mobilisation.

As a result, two competing sources of legitimacy have effectively emerged inside the Republican People’s Party: one grounded in the court ruling, the other in support from delegates and party structures.

Why did Erdoğan emerge as the biggest beneficiary?

At present, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu appears to be a more advantageous figure for the ruling Justice and Development Party and for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan personally.

The reason is straightforward: Özgür Özel had already come to be viewed as a genuine political threat after CHP became the largest party in the 2024 local elections under his leadership. Moreover, those elections marked the first time in decades that the Republican People’s Party had gained a clear advantage over its rivals.

Kılıçdaroğlu, by contrast, spent 13 years leading the party without winning a nationwide election.

His return through a court ruling has also increased the risk of an internal split within CHP and weakened the broader anti-Erdoğan camp.

Statements from representatives of the ruling bloc appear to support that interpretation.

Justice Minister Akın Gürlek said the ruling was intended to protect the will of congress delegates and stressed that the option of appealing to the Supreme Court remains open.

Meanwhile, AKP deputy chairman Efkan Ala said CHP should not blame AKP for its defeats in court or internal party disputes.

Even before the ruling, Devlet Bahçeli, head of the Nationalist Movement Party, expressed hope that CHP would avoid internal chaos and division.

Taken together, these reactions suggest that the ruling bloc is trying, on the one hand, to legitimise the court decision and, on the other, to maintain the appearance of political distance from the process.

Attention now turns to the Supreme Court

On 24 May, the crisis entered a new phase. Celal Çelik, lawyer for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, appealed to police to clear the building, and authorities in Ankara confirmed receiving the request.

Police subsequently entered the CHP headquarters, using tear gas and rubber bullets. Journalists were removed from the building, while reports indicated significant damage inside.

Leaving the headquarters, Özgür Özel said they would return. He then joined supporters in a march towards parliament.

The next stage will centre on an appeal before the Supreme Court. If the country’s highest judicial body overturns the ruling, Özel’s organisational advantage could once again become a legal one. If the decision remains in force — a scenario many observers consider more likely — the most realistic softer exit for CHP may be to hold a new congress and reaffirm legitimacy through another internal vote.

Otherwise, the party could spend months trapped in a situation of parallel leadership, mutual accusations and continued tensions in both the streets and the courts.

Under such a scenario, Turkey’s main opposition force may direct its energy ahead of the 2028 elections not towards competing with the government, but towards internal struggle. If that happens, the main political beneficiary could once again be Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Crisis in Turkey’s opposition party