A significant event took place in the French town of Bougival, near Paris: on July 12, a historic agreement was signed between the French government and pro-independence supporters of New Caledonia on the creation of the State of New Caledonia.
The idea was actively supported by Azerbaijan from the very beginning.
According to the agreement, this territory in the Pacific will remain part of France but will receive a new constitutional status as a state. A referendum on this status is planned in New Caledonia for 2026.
Representatives of the French government and the New Caledonia delegation at the Élysée Palace in Paris, July 12, 2025 | photo: Tom Nicholson / Pool
This agreement on the region’s future was reached in a context of particular interest to Azerbaijan, which has tense relations with France.
Over the past two years, official Baku has sought to position itself at the forefront of a “global anti-colonial front” and, in this capacity, has been active in various French territories, including New Caledonia.
The main actor in this effort has been the Baku Initiative Group (BIG).
However, when the agreement on New Caledonia was reached, BIG issued no official response.
This raises questions about the group’s claims of a “determined anti-colonial struggle” as well as the credibility and durability of the Azerbaijani government’s strategy to use this platform.
Baku Initiative Group: purpose, structure, and lack of transparency
The Baku Initiative Group was established in 2023 and presents itself as a non-governmental organization supporting the international fight against French colonialism.
In its statements on the LinkedIn platform, the Baku Initiative Group describes itself as “a platform for international cooperation against global colonialism and neocolonialism.”
International thematic conference “Towards the Decolonization of Guadeloupe! Challenges and Prospects,” dedicated to Guadeloupe, held in Baku on June 25, 2025 | photo: Baku Initiative Group
The group’s main activity is reportedly focused on providing political and cultural support to independence movements in French overseas territories, particularly in regions such as New Caledonia and Guadeloupe.
BIG claims to support “peoples fighting for freedom” in accordance with the norms of international law.
However, there is no transparent information about the organization’s legal status or its sources of funding.
BIG’s events are held in close coordination with Azerbaijani state institutions. Representatives of the group sign memorandums alongside the Speaker of the Milli Majlis, and their press conferences are covered by state-run media outlets.
A memorandum of cooperation was signed between the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan and the Congress of New Caledonia on April 18, 2024 | photo: Milli Majlis
This also demonstrates that, despite presenting itself as an NGO, BIG is effectively a diplomatic tool of the Azerbaijani government.
Its role goes beyond supporting French overseas territories — it is used as leverage in the growing political confrontation between Baku and Paris in recent years.
Between rhetoric and reality: Azerbaijan’s issues with France
MP Parvana Valiyeva from the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, in a comment to APA news agency, called BIG’s activity a “foreign policy success for Azerbaijan” and framed the recent agreement in New Caledonia as a victory for President Ilham Aliyev:
“Macron has once again lost to the President of Azerbaijan on the issue of colonialism,” Valiyeva said.
In New Caledonia, protesters wave the flags of Azerbaijan and New Caledonia, March 29, 2024 | photo: “X”
This statement also shows that official Baku views BIG’s activities not only ideologically but also as part of a geopolitical revenge – especially against the backdrop of deteriorating relations with France since 2020.
In 2023, France sharply criticized Baku over the Karabakh conflict, and Azerbaijan, in turn, sought to expose human rights violations in French colonies, leading to a kind of “war for legitimacy.”
New Caledonia: historic resistance and the latest turn
New Caledonia was occupied by France in 1853 and was long used as a penal colony. The indigenous Kanak people were denied cultural and political rights for centuries.
This territory, with a population of about 270,000, more than 40% of whom are indigenous Kanaks, is a French overseas territory. Following civil clashes in the 1980s, autonomy has been gradually expanded since 1998 under the Nouméa Agreement.
Kanak independence supporters on Ouen Island, New Caledonia | photo: Dominic Catton / The Guardian
Although the “no independence” option won in three referendums held in 2018, 2020, and 2021, the last referendum was boycotted by the Kanak population, making its result internationally disputed.
According to the new agreement signed in July, New Caledonia remains part of France but is declared a “state” with constitutional status. A new citizenship institution is established, and in the future, the possibility of discussing international recognition is opened.
“Decorative” decolonization?
Interestingly, despite active reactions from global media, Kanak leaders, and the French government regarding this agreement, the Baku Initiative Group made no public statements.
While close ties with New Caledonia were being established in 2023–2024, interparliamentary documents were signed, and BIG representatives spoke at UN forums defending Kanak rights.
This further deepens doubts about the organization’s activities. Although this agreement could have been considered a significant turning point for the movement BIG claimed to support.
Moreover, at an international meeting held in Tirana in May 2025, friendly dialogue and conciliatory gestures were observed between President Ilham Aliyev and French President Emmanuel Macron.
Since that event, BIG’s activity has noticeably declined.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev hold an informal conversation during the 6th Summit of the European Political Community in Albania, May 16, 2025 | photo: president.az
Since 2023, the Baku Initiative Group has held conferences with independence activists from New Caledonia, issued statements, and provided support for covering legal expenses.
In April 2024, a memorandum of cooperation was signed between BIG and a deputy from New Caledonia’s separatist wing. However, the newly elected Speaker of the Parliament, Weilma Falaeo, later announced its annulment, calling the document “external interference.”
This indicates that Azerbaijan’s initiative has a weak legal basis as well as legitimacy issues.
Critics highlight a selective approach in BIG’s activities.
For example, in a statement published by OC Media, political analyst Bahruz Samedov, currently imprisoned, said this Azerbaijani initiative is part of a geopolitical confrontation with France.
The analyst questions why BIG does not show similar sensitivity toward other colonial powers.
Historians Jamil Hasanly and Altay Geyushov also view BIG’s activities as “internal propaganda and a political game against the West.”
OC Media also reports that activists linked to financial and organizational support from BIG were arrested in connection with unrest in New Caledonia.
Opposition politician Jamil Hasanly called this initiative “absurd,” mocking the idea that “a poorer country grants freedom to a richer territory.”
President Aliyev’s rhetoric and geopolitical goals
At the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Summit held in Baku in November 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev sharply criticized France and the Netherlands for their colonial policies and practices of racial discrimination.
Aliyev has also repeatedly accused France of pursuing neocolonial policies in the South Caucasus, particularly in supporting Armenia on the Karabakh issue.
Against this backdrop, the creation of the Baku Initiative Group coincided with a peak period of tension in Azerbaijani-French relations and can be seen as a tool combining political rhetoric with practical activity.
Conclusion: diplomatic initiative or geopolitical simulation?
The “decolonization initiatives” carried out by the Azerbaijani government through BIG are currently at a stage of either transformation or decline.
The organization’s silence during a “historic turning point” in New Caledonia, along with a wave of criticism, shows that this policy is more symbolic and selective diplomatic rhetoric against France rather than a genuine anti-colonial movement.
The latest agreement on New Caledonia effectively excludes BIG and Azerbaijan’s diplomatic line in this direction from the ongoing process. This calls into question BIG’s real influence and suggests that the organization serves more of a symbolic and political role.
If BIG continues to seek global support and legitimacy, it will need to focus its efforts not only on actions against France but also on addressing the broader colonial legacy, establishing legal mechanisms, and fostering genuine public solidarity.
