Split in Turkey’s opposition: how a feud between two leaders is strengthening President Erdoğan’s position

Turkey’s opposition split and the FETO allegations

An unprecedented crisis within Turkey’s main opposition force, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has grown beyond a simple power struggle between its two leading figures, Kemal Kilicdaroglu and Ozgur Ozel.

Pro-government voices have framed the dispute with accusations of links to FETO, the movement associated with US-based Islamic preacher Fethullah Gulen, which Turkey designates as a terrorist organisation. Ankara accuses the network of orchestrating the failed military coup attempt of 15 July 2016. The movement strongly denies the allegation.

The bitter confrontation between the two opposition factions, which has included physical clashes at party offices and police involvement, is also unfolding against the backdrop of discussions on constitutional reform. In practice, the conflict is strengthening the arguments of the ruling camp led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Background

The current crisis within Turkey’s opposition began on 21 May 2026, when a court in Ankara invalidated the 38th congress of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which took place on 4–5 November 2023.

As a result, party leader Ozgur Ozel and other officials elected at that congress were removed from office. The court reinstated former leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who had been elected at the previous 37th congress, along with his allies.

The decision also invalidated the party’s recent extraordinary congress.

Turkish and international media outlets, as well as various organisations, described the ruling as unprecedented in the country’s political history.

For the first time in the country’s history, a court removed an elected party leadership from office.

Many observers said the case was more than an internal party dispute. They described it as political interference carried out through the judicial system and likely backed by the authorities.

• Human Rights Watch openly described the ruling as a move aimed at neutralising the opposition.
• The Guardian and Associated Press presented the incident as the latest episode in a broader pattern of pressure on the opposition during Erdoğan’s rule.

Kılıçdaroğlu calls rivals “traitors” as pro-government media link them to FETO

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech on 30 May escalated the dispute further.

Earlier that day, police cleared CHP headquarters after clashes with supporters of Özgür Özel occupying the building. Once authorities forced them to leave, Kılıçdaroğlu held a celebratory gathering there with his own supporters.

Turkish media reported that his event attracted a significantly smaller crowd than Özel’s rally, which took place simultaneously in Güven Park.

But the more significant difference lay in the political message. Kılıçdaroğlu adopted a far more confrontational tone.

In his speech, Kılıçdaroğlu spoke of “treason”, “bribery” and “foreign connections” within the party.

Without naming specific individuals, he said he regretted failing to identify in time what he described as “people linked to foreign powers”. He also said he had failed to remove figures allegedly involved in corruption from municipal administrations.

Pro-government media outlets highlighted the speech under the headline: “I apologise to Turkey for FETO members and corrupt figures within the CHP.”

In effect, the remarks amounted to a political accusation directed at the alliance between Özgür Özel and Ekrem Imamoglu, the elected mayor of Istanbul, who is currently in custody. In recent years, many observers have regarded İmamoğlu as one of Erdoğan’s strongest potential challengers.

Reports published by pro-government broadcasters A Haber and TGRT, as well as the newspaper Yeni Safak, linked İmamoğlu and Özel’s team to allegations that delegates received money in exchange for votes at the controversial 38th party congress.

Authorities soon launched corruption investigations into municipalities run by İmamoğlu’s supporters. Investigators also examined alleged links between certain individuals and FETO.

In Turkey, accusations of links to FETO carry consequences beyond political rhetoric. Following the failed coup attempt in 2016, such allegations frequently led to dismissals from public institutions and the arrest of thousands of people.

For that reason, some commentators view the growing focus on alleged FETO links involving Özel and his associates as a possible effort to prepare public opinion for future legal action.

Özel, for his part, sought to move the crisis beyond a personal dispute.

Speaking at a rally in Güven Park, he argued that the issue was not a conflict between Özgür Özel and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, but a confrontation between Erdoğan and the Turkish people.

Could the split in the CHP make it easier for President Erdoğan to push through a new constitution?

In May 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the creation of a team of ten legal experts to draft a new constitution. He presented the initiative as an effort to replace what he described as a “coup-era constitution”.

Critics fear that the real objective may be to create a legal mechanism that would allow Erdoğan to maintain political continuity beyond 2028, when his final constitutionally permitted presidential term is due to end.

Many analysts see a connection between three parallel developments:

• the split within the opposition and efforts to weaken the faction most strongly opposed to the ruling party;
• discussions about constitutional change and the possibility of extending Erdoğan’s time in power;
• the new “Turkey Without Terrorism” process and attempts to win support among Kurdish voters.

The “Turkey Without Terrorism” process

The initiative aims to bring a definitive end to the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Kurdish movement that has waged an armed insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984.

Turkey, the United States and the European Union classify the PKK as a terrorist organisation. However, in May 2025, the group announced its dissolution and declared an end to its armed struggle against Turkey.

That development created an opportunity for Erdoğan to attract support among Kurdish voters.

A key player in that effort could be the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), which primarily represents Kurdish voters. The party rejects claims of organisational ties to the PKK and presents itself as a democratic political force.

In previous years, Turkish authorities frequently criticised DEM. Today, however, the party holds seats in parliament and could play a decisive role in any vote on constitutional reform.

In exchange for support, the government could offer amendments to constitutional provisions that are particularly important to the Kurdish community. Discussions often focus on Articles 66 and 42.

Article 66 states that “everyone bound to the Turkish state through citizenship is a Turk”, while Article 42 provides that “no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens in any educational institution”.

For years, DEM has advocated “equal citizenship” and education in native languages other than Turkish. Those demands centre directly on these constitutional provisions.

To submit constitutional amendments to a referendum, the ruling alliance must secure at least 360 votes in parliament. To pass amendments without a referendum, it would need at least 400 votes.

The governing bloc does not have enough votes on its own.

As a result, even a relatively small but disciplined group of CHP lawmakers loyal to Kılıçdaroğlu could become a crucial factor if it aligned with DEM, independent MPs or other smaller political groups.

What comes next?

Recent developments within Turkey’s opposition have reinforced concerns that the authorities can use the judicial system as a tool of political control.

Some analysts outline a worst-case scenario that could unfold as follows:

• The Republican People’s Party, Turkey’s oldest and largest opposition force, could split permanently.
• Authorities could arrest members of the faction that continues to challenge the government.
• Pro-government media outlets could help legitimise those actions in the public sphere.
• The government could gain greater room for manoeuvre, both in the event of early elections and in negotiations over constitutional amendments that would benefit the current ruling camp.

In this scenario, the struggle inside the CHP would cease to be merely an internal party conflict and would instead become part of a broader political transformation that could reshape Turkey’s opposition landscape and influence the country’s constitutional future.

Turkey’s opposition split and the FETO allegations