Opinion from Baku: What could Russia-Iran's closer ties mean for South Caucasus?
Russia-Iran ties and South Caucasus
On January 17, Russia and Iran are set to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement comprising 47 articles and covering various areas of cooperation. “This is happening just days before Trump’s inauguration, adding a sense of urgency to the event,” Azerbaijani analysts note.
According to analysts from the South Caucasus Studies Center (CSSC), the most globally significant aspects of the Russia-Iran strategic partnership agreement are related to security, military-technical cooperation, and mutual obligations. They raised the key question: “What will change after signing the agreement that hasn’t already existed?”
“Currently, Iran supplies weapons to Russia, albeit inconsistently. Russia provides fifth-generation fighter jet technologies and air defense components. Iranian and Russian defense ministries, including via the IRGC, conduct regular consultations. Essentially, this agreement will formalize what already exists, giving legitimacy to ongoing bilateral interactions.
The intrigue lies in how mutual obligations will be outlined. Will the parties commit to defending each other if attacked by a third country, as seen in the agreement between Russia and North Korea? I’d suggest not.
Given the threat of potential strikes on Iranian territory from the U.S. and Israel, Russia is unlikely to commit to defending Iran, just as Iran wouldn’t consider Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region a reason to defend Russia. This is not a military alliance but a strategic partnership agreement.
Another globally relevant element is China. This agreement involves two of Beijing’s key partners. It remains to be seen how this will impact Moscow and Tehran’s relations with China. At first glance, this appears to foster mutual integration among the partners, but agreements like this increase the individual agency of Russia and Iran in their dealings with Beijing.”
What does this mean for South Caucasus?
“Agreements between Russia and Iran are a unique subject, given the deep-seated stereotypes both countries have about each other. Opportunism plays a dominant role.
Currently, Russia and Iran are the two countries that have suffered the greatest losses in the Middle East, with their positions continuing to weaken.
The post-Syria collapse of agreements with Turkey, which previously extended to the South Caucasus in some form, has changed the dynamics. The most realistic scenario now is joint Russian-Iranian efforts to counter Ankara’s growing influence in the region. The only place they cannot allow this is Armenia.
Deeper ties between the EAEU and Iran, alongside this agreement, further tighten the noose around Armenia—especially given the current Armenian government’s declared push for European integration and increased U.S. and French presence in its defense system. It can even be assumed that Iran will also oppose Armenia’s exit from the CSTO. Should that happen, Iran might position itself as Armenia’s military ally, meaning any reduction in Russia’s role in Armenia could come at the expense of increased Iranian presence.
Armenia faces difficult choices, as Pashinyan’s diversification of foreign policy focuses on expanding the role of the U.S. and EU in Armenia. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran share a consensus on reducing Western influence in the region.
For Moscow and Tehran, the positions of Baku and Tbilisi in this context are currently satisfactory. Here, the competition is limited primarily to Turkey.
How will the upcoming agreement affect the North-South and Zangezur transport corridors (through Armenia and Iran)? That remains to be seen.”
This is a question we will get an answer to in the near future.
I assume that Iran’s position will undergo some changes, and there will be some activity, at least in the form of statements. How much this will translate into reality will depend on the situation that develops after Trump’s first 100 days.”
Russia-Iran ties and South Caucasus
