Goodbye, Orbán! How did the 16-year rule of the Kremlin’s best friend in the European Union come to an end?

Elections in Hungary

The era of uninterrupted rule by Viktor Orbán and his right-conservative party Fidesz in Hungary, which began in 2010, has come to an end. During his years in power, Orbán redesigned the electoral system to make it as difficult as possible for the opposition. However, in the parliamentary elections held on April 12, 2026, this did not prevent the right-wing Tisza party from winning: according to preliminary data, it is securing 138 out of 199 seats.

Tisza’s leader, Péter Magyar, intends to significantly adjust Hungary’s foreign policy: to improve relations with the European Union and Ukraine, as well as to adopt a “pragmatic approach” toward Russia. No sharp unfriendly steps toward Moscow are expected, but a gradual reduction in dependence on Russian energy resources is вполне likely.

For more on how the election campaign unfolded and the consequences of its results, see the article by Novaya Gazeta Europe.

“Victory of all Hungarians”

On the eve of the elections, Hungary’s National Election Office warned that a winner might not be determined either on the evening of April 12 or on the morning of the 13th, as the race appeared extremely competitive. It was expected that the outcome would be decided by votes from abroad and ballots cast by voters outside their place of registration, and that counting them would take several days.

But the suspense quickly faded. At 8:00 p.m. local time, polling stations closed and the vote count began. When 40% of the ballots had been processed, champagne was already being opened at the headquarters of the opposition Tisza party. At 9:11 p.m., party leader Péter Magyar wrote on Facebook that Viktor Orbán had called him and congratulated him on his victory. Soon afterward, he said, congratulations began arriving from abroad—from Emmanuel Macron, Manfred Weber, Friedrich Merz, and Mark Rutte.

Speaking at a victory rally in central Budapest, Magyar said that the scale of the victory was “visible from every Hungarian window,” whether in a rural house or a city apartment block. He thanked Hungarians for saying “no” to “deceit, lies, and betrayal,” and added that in the “battle of David and Goliath,” love had prevailed. “Let this victory be the victory of all Hungarians, including those who did not vote for Tisza,” said the future prime minister.

Viktor Orbán, speaking to his supporters, acknowledged defeat and called the result painful.

“We do not yet know what the election results will mean for the fate of our country and our nation—time will tell. But we will serve our country even in opposition,” he said. “We will not give up. Never, never, never, under any circumstances will we give up.” The coming days, Orbán added, will be spent “healing wounds,” after which the work will continue.

Hungary’s parliament has 199 seats: 93 are allocated through party lists under a proportional system, and 106 through single-member constituencies. According to preliminary data, Tisza is set to receive 138 mandates—more than two-thirds, giving it a constitutional majority. Fidesz, together with the KDNP, can expect 55 seats, while the far-right Our Homeland party is projected to win six. The first session of the new parliament must take place no later than May 12.

In the current parliament, the Fidesz–KDNP alliance held 135 mandates, the opposition coalition had 57, Our Homeland had six, and one additional seat was held by a representative of the German national minority.

“Choose while there’s still time”

Given the unprecedentedly high stakes, both campaigns—Tisza and Fidesz—continued right up to the last moment: Hungarian law does not provide for a day of silence before voting.

In the final days before the election, Tisza urged its supporters to use every opportunity to campaign. “You have to talk to everyone—to your hairdresser, a shop assistant, a colleague, a gas station attendant, a market vendor, even the person standing next to you in line. Every conversation matters,” the party said on Saturday.

On the same day, Tisza leader Péter Magyar also addressed Hungarians living abroad, urging them to return to the country urgently and not miss the decisive vote. He reinforced his appeal with lines from Sándor Petőfi’s “National Song”—one of the key symbols of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848: “Rise up, Magyar! The homeland calls! Choose, while there is still time: to accept a life of servitude or to live in freedom?”

The following day, during the voting itself, Magyar said that the final hours of Orbán’s rule had come and once again urged everyone who had not yet voted to be sure to go to the polls.

Magyar consistently sought to convey to voters the idea of the historic significance of these elections. Judging by the travel map he published, his tour across the country was far more intensive than that of the incumbent prime minister. His schedule included four to six appearances a day, including in small villages that had traditionally been considered strongholds of the ruling party.

Magyar’s endurance was well known in advance. In 2025, already preparing for the elections, he walked about 300 kilometers from Budapest to the Romanian border—a symbolic attempt to unite a divided nation step by step.

But Viktor Orbán also ran a highly active campaign. On the morning of April 11, he announced a short-term initiative called “One Million Handshakes” and urged supporters, voters, and Fidesz candidates to meet and talk with as many people as possible in order to reach that number by the end of the day. Orbán himself joined the effort. “We’ve been on the road all day, no complaints about the atmosphere—most people are with us everywhere!” he wrote on Facebook. By April 12, however, it had become clear that this was more wishful thinking than reality.

Be that as it may, both parties succeeded in conveying their main message to voters: on election day, staying at home was not an option. Turnout reached a record 77.8%, which is 10 percentage points higher than in the 2022 elections.

A concert on the edge of hooliganism

Viktor Orbán formally concluded his campaign on the evening of April 11 at a mass rally in Budapest’s Holy Trinity Square. He promised that “Hungary will remain an island of peace,” proudly stated that “in Europe there is still a country where the father is a man and the mother is a woman,” and praised his supporters for transforming from a “silent majority” into a “loud majority.”

Péter Magyar officially ended his campaign in the country’s second-largest city, Debrecen. But the climax of the opposition’s mobilization was an event held the previous day in Budapest titled the “Grand Concert for the Dismantling of the System.” The seven-hour concert gathered around 100,000 people, mostly young participants. Speaking to journalists, attendees mockingly referred to familiar propaganda clichés—for example, claims that they were “Ukrainian spies” or had been paid to attend. Through the media, they also addressed their grandparents, the traditional Fidesz electorate: “Think about our future.”

Political sympathies were also openly expressed by the performers. More than 40 well-known Hungarian bands and artists took the stage. Rapper Saiid said he saw before him not “traitors,” but people who want to live in a free country, and called on security forces to “switch to the side of the people.”

Legendary rock musician János Bródy, together with the band Ivan & The Parazol, performed the song Ezek ugyanazok (“They Are the Same”)—for Hungarians, it is roughly comparable to Viktor Tsoi’s song “Changes” for Russians. It speaks about how times and slogans change, while the same opportunists, sycophants, and hypocrites remain in power. Bródy expressed hope that after April 12 this song would become obsolete.

The punk band Hétköznapi Csalódások opened their performance by chanting the slogan “Dirty Fidesz!”, performed the song Viktor, and sarcastically said goodbye: “Goodbye! Auf Wiedersehen, and especially ‘see you later’,” adding that this is how “Viktor and his master Putin” would say it.

Other performances were even more radical. The punk rockers Központi Hatalom called Fidesz voters “backward” and said they belonged “in a Russian barracks.” A member of the rap duo Hősök shocked the audience with an obscene act and insults directed at the head of Orbán’s cabinet, Gergely Gulyás.

In the end, such radicalism became a gift to the government. Prime Minister’s political adviser Balázs Orbán wrote on Facebook: “This hatred will be at the ballot boxes tomorrow. Let’s show that there are more of us—those who believe in the power of love and unity.” Government spokesperson Zoltán Kovács published a collage of two photos: one showing the Hősök provocation, labeled Tisza, and the other showing a smiling family with two children as an image of a happy Hungary under Fidesz.

Breaking through the information blockade

Battles on social media took place throughout the entire campaign. Online, for example, videos were widely circulated warning voters that if Tisza won, Hungarian soldiers would be sent to the front line, although the party’s program contains nothing of the sort. The Economist noted that this narrative proved particularly effective with parts of the audience, including Roma communities.

Opposition supporters online were even more active and creative: they ran livestreams, spread memes, and used other digital formats. The faces of the anti-Fidesz online campaign included young influencers, among them Oszikaaa—21-year-old Oskar Kállai, whose videos receive millions of views.

It was the internet that helped Péter Magyar and his supporters break through the information blockade created by the almost complete control of traditional media by the authorities. A key role in this system is played by the KESMA foundation, which controls more than 500 local and national media outlets.

State television MTVA also retains particular importance. In 2025, it received a record 160.8 billion forints from the budget for its operations—more than 400 million euros. From February to June 2025, politicians from the ruling Fidesz–KDNP coalition received 73% of news airtime on MTVA, with almost no negative coverage.

All opposition politicians together accounted for only 27% of airtime, and even then they were most often mentioned in a negative context.

Statistics for the campaign period itself have yet to be compiled, but they are unlikely to differ significantly.

A similar situation existed in outdoor advertising. Since almost all advertising space in the country is owned by companies close to Fidesz, Tisza posters were rarely seen. In contrast, Péter Magyar’s face regularly appeared on Fidesz billboards under the slogan “They are dangerous,” where his photo was placed alongside that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. It appears that the principle “negative advertising is still advertising” was not particularly taken into account by the Hungarian authorities.

Facing Brussels

Such a concentration of resources allowed the authorities to impose a simple dichotomy on voters: “Orbán is peace, Magyar is war.” The opposition leader was portrayed either as a puppet of Brussels or as a Ukrainian agent.

However, this was a clear exaggeration. Throughout the campaign, Magyar was cautious on the issue of Ukraine: he opposed supplying Hungarian weapons to Kyiv and proposed putting the question of Ukraine’s accelerated EU accession to a referendum. As an unnamed European diplomat told Politico, “Ukraine is not a popular topic among Hungarian voters,” so Magyar would likely have to act very carefully. Ukrainian experts also acknowledged that a change of government in Budapest would not automatically mean a policy shift in Kyiv’s favor.

Nevertheless, at least in the initial stage, Ukraine may receive some positive news. This includes, for example, the unblocking of a €90 billion EU loan that Orbán had opposed, as well as the adoption of the 20th package of sanctions against Russia. Previously, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico had also criticized the initiative, but without an ally his position may become less firm.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was among the first to congratulate Péter Magyar and stated his readiness for “meetings and joint constructive work for the benefit of both countries, as well as for peace, security, and stability in Europe.”

It is also clear that a honeymoon period in relations between Budapest and Brussels is likely ahead.

“Hungary has chosen Europe. Europe has always chosen Hungary. The country is returning to the European path. The Union is becoming stronger,” wrote European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on X.

For its part, Brussels may soon unblock €8.4 billion for Hungary from the EU Cohesion Fund, €9.5 billion from the Recovery Fund, as well as approve a concessional loan of €17.4 billion under the SAFE program. According to economists, all of this could significantly support the Hungarian economy.

At the same time, Magyar would, of course, not be a “puppet of the EU.” He spoke about his desire to normalize relations with Brussels, but with mandatory consideration of Hungary’s national interests.

He would likely take a similarly firm line on agriculture and environmental policy as Orbán. On the sensitive issue of migration, there also appears to be no fundamental difference between them: Magyar supports strict border control and the preservation of national sovereignty over asylum policy.

As for Russia, Magyar agreed that Vladimir Putin is a “threat to Hungary, Europe, and European civilization.” During the campaign, chants of “Russians, go home!” were heard at Tisza events. After the party’s victory, supporters chanted the same in central Budapest, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk included the phrase in his congratulatory message to Magyar on X.

However, a sharp break with Moscow should not be expected from the new government. Magyar emphasized that Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia will persist for some time, as diversification of supplies cannot happen overnight. According to him, Russia should not be the “almost sole” supplier, but only “one of many.” “If necessary, we will negotiate, but we will not become friends [with Russia],” he noted.

Overall, it is important to understand that the 2026 election was not a clash between two ideologically incompatible figures. Both politicians are positioned on the right wing. The difference is that the Tisza leader appealed to the image of Orbán from 1998—a young pro-European conservative, not yet burdened by “mafia-like” ties.

Magyar built his campaign primarily around domestic issues: corruption in the “mafia state,” chronic underfunding of hospitals and schools, economic stagnation, budget deficits, the risk of credit ratings being downgraded to “junk” status, and a cost-of-living crisis. A typical Tisza social media post looked something like this: “Józsi used to have enough salary to last until the end of the month, but now he doesn’t… Retirement is getting closer, but it doesn’t comfort him—it worries him… There is no anger in Józsi—more a sense of exhaustion.”

According to Tisza, a change of government would help precisely such people. Magyar even claimed that provincial Hungary had already risen against Orbán’s “corrupt and inhumane government.” Judging by the election results, this claim was not entirely far from reality.

All for victory

Although Péter Magyar had expressed confidence in his party’s victory in advance, he also warned supporters not to relax, as anything could be expected from those in power. On Saturday, he claimed that Fidesz representatives were allegedly preparing a “series of false-flag operations coordinated with Russian agents and on their advice”—in particular, provocations at polling stations disguised as Tisza activists.

Such concerns did not appear entirely unfounded given previous experience. In the last elections, independent observers recorded cases of so-called “chain voting.” The first participant in the scheme would receive a ballot and an envelope, place an empty envelope in the ballot box, and take the blank ballot paper outside. There, a party operative would mark it as required, after which the next voter would bring the filled ballot back to the polling station and take out a new blank one. According to the outlet Átlátszó, this practice was actively used in rural areas in 2022 to secure an almost 100% result in favor of the ruling party.

Independent observers also did not consider the current campaign fair. For example, the authors of the investigative documentary The Price of a Vote, shown in Budapest shortly before election day, claimed that the ruling party had built a large-scale pressure network across 53 of the 106 constituencies. According to their estimates, the campaign was intended to reach up to 600,000 people—around 10% of the expected turnout.

In rural areas, supporters of the government were reportedly offering residents 50,000–60,000 forints (about €130–€160) for a “correct” vote. Loyalty was also said to be bought with food, firewood, promises of jobs, and even a cheap synthetic drug called “smoki,” which is popular in poorer villages.

Local municipal leaders played a key role in this system, as they often controlled access to essential resources. In one village, for example, a Fidesz mayor also worked as a doctor. According to the film’s claims, he threatened patients with withholding prescriptions if they did not vote for the ruling party.

At the same time as administrative pressure, physical tension in the campaign also increased. A distinctive feature of this electoral cycle was the appearance of organized groups of strong men in black jackets, which the press dubbed “Hungarian titushki.” They accompanied the prime minister on his trips and helped drown out dissenting voices at pro-government rallies. When necessary, this “support group” blocked the path of protesters, snatched away their placards, and chanted slogans in support of Fidesz.

However, actions in the grey and black zones were only an addition to the fully legal and long-established mechanisms of maintaining power, to which Fidesz traditionally paid great attention. Over the years in office, Orbán’s allies implemented a series of initiatives that made it easier for the party to retain control.

But on April 12, 2026, none of these manipulations saved either Fidesz or Viktor Orbán personally. Fatigue with 16 years of uninterrupted rule by the same politician proved stronger.

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