'Unprecedented case and format': Pashinyan's interview with Turkish journalists
Pashinyan’s interview with Turkish journalists in Yerevan
“As far as I remember, this is an unprecedented case and format. There has never been a meeting in this format. And I think it’s good that we have the opportunity today to communicate and exchange thoughts,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said at the beginning of his meeting with Turkish journalists.
They arrived in Yerevan “at the initiative of the Armenian side and at the expense of the state budget,” according to the prime minister’s office.
“The goal is, as much as possible, to directly and comprehensively present Armenia’s approaches to establishing stable peace in the region and to resolving relations between Armenia and Turkey,” said Gor Tsarukyan, the Director of the Public Relations and Information Center at the Armenian Prime Minister’s Office.
According to him, the center invited representatives of 10 Turkish media outlets for the interview with Nikol Pashinyan. All agreed to send their journalists to Yerevan. The prime minister’s office made an effort to include the most influential publications in the guest list—both state-owned and private, pro-government and opposition.
Pashinyan answered all questions from the Turkish journalists. According to the video, the meeting took place in a friendly atmosphere, despite the sensitive and complex issues addressed by both Armenia and Turkey. The prime minister seemed to try to answer questions as openly and in as much detail as possible.
Pashinyan’s answers to the Turkish journalists’ questions, key points raised during the interview, and the main message the prime minister wanted to convey to the Turkish audience.
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Where does process of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia stand? (Sözcü TV)
“Today, Armenia and Turkey have established direct dialogue. And if we consider the previous period in our relations, this is a very significant change. Diplomatic representatives of Armenia and Turkey are in constant direct contact with each other. On the surface, it may seem like this is not a very concrete result. But for me and for the representatives of the government system, it is a concrete result. Because before, we were even deprived of the opportunity to clarify each other’s views.
We used to find out what Ankara thought through third countries. And Ankara, in essence, also learned what Yerevan thought through third countries.
Now, even our various representatives can simply call and ask what your opinion is on this issue. And that is a substantial change. I am confident this will yield results. We better understand mutually the challenges and problems each side faces, what issues need further clarification, and where views and perspectives diverge. And I must say plainly that I consider this a very important achievement.
During this period, we have already had several meetings with President Erdoğan, and there have been phone conversations. Foreign ministers have communicated and continue to communicate. Special representatives for the normalization of relations are in contact with each other. We already have concrete examples of cooperation: recently, we handed over two individuals to Turkey who were wanted in Turkey.
And of course, efforts must be made to ensure that this momentum does not stop and continues. This, in turn, depends, among other things, on the political will of the leaders and governments of both countries. I see political will.”
Why does Pashinyan frequently talk about perception of history in society, and what is he trying to achieve? (Anadolu news agency)
“Every country must engage with its history. There is a saying that we need to learn from history. And this is already a matter of political choice and political perception — what lesson to draw from it.
Yes, I often talk about history. And my main message is the following: it is necessary to distinguish between history and the present day. We cannot confuse the future with history. In my view, the future should not be a mirror reflection of history but an opportunity to correct or improve the pages of history that we wish to enhance. But this too is a matter of political choice.
Therefore, my perspective is that we should use the lessons from history to serve the interests of our present-day state, the Republic of Armenia, its state interests, and the interests of the future.
However, I want to emphasize once again that this is not about changing or denying history. It’s about changing the practical perception of history.
Why do we use history? To make historical confrontations eternal? Or to use historical conflicts as a prompt to build a peaceful, partnership-based, and stable future in the regional context? I support the second perception.”
How does the issue of genocide affect relations between Armenia and Turkey? (Hürriyet Daily News)
“Our official position is that the international recognition of the Armenian genocide is not currently one of our foreign policy priorities. This is the official formulation. In Armenia, and not only in Armenia, there are discussions and speculations that the issue is about denial or forgetting the question of genocide.
I want to make it very clear that this is an indisputable truth in Armenia and among Armenians. That is, to deny or forget it in our reality is simply impossible.
When the parliament or government of a distant country makes a decision [on recognizing the genocide], we are very encouraged. But when the enthusiasm or joy from this decision fades, the next question arises: what does this decision give us in our relations with our closest surroundings? When we face tensions in our immediate environment, to what extent do these tensions contribute to stability, peace, and so on, in our country, in our region?
The question arises: where and how should we focus on serving the national interests of Armenia? Because the period when this great tragedy occurred was a period when the Republic of Armenia did not exist.
Today, the Republic of Armenia exists, an internationally recognized state, and this internationally recognized state has the ability to ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens. And for that, certain conditions are needed.
We have made great achievements, peace – with Australia, with New Zealand, with Brazil. And we really have that. We are happy that we have normal relations. But we need peace and good relations, first of all, with our environment, with our closest neighbors. Because peace, the peace that brings concrete results for the safety and well-being of our country, is peace here.
However, there is now an opportunity to change the perception, the wording of the issue. The opportunity arose after messages came from both Armenia and Turkey, expressing a desire from both sides to change the wording of these issues, shift the focus, and change the perspectives.”
Is there possibility of normalizing relations? (In response to question from Hürriyet Daily News)
“I want to say honestly that sometimes it is very difficult to dispel the pessimism of pessimists. Because in 2022, an agreement was reached [on allowing third-country citizens with diplomatic passports to cross the Armenian-Turkish land border]. And many people say: here’s a simple example — an agreement was reached, but it’s not being implemented. Therefore, we should fix the failure of this policy. I do not agree with this.
Both I and our political team are determined, patient, and consistent in our efforts to make the region a source of stability, peace, and prosperity for the Republic of Armenia through dialogue, conversation, facts, and arguments.
After the 2021 elections, our government’s program included an item we call regionalization..
It’s just a word, but it contains many layers. It means that, in conducting our policy, we see ourselves, first and foremost, as a regional country. This does not mean that we will limit, stop, or reduce our other relationships. But we view ourselves primarily as a regional country.
Returning to the dynamics of our relations with Turkey, I am confident that if we move forward consistently, calmly, based on arguments, and in an atmosphere of mutual respect, the question will not be whether normalization will happen or not. The question will be when normalization will happen. It will only be a matter of time.”
What is Armenia’s position on the ‘Zangezur corridor‘? (NTV)
“First of all, the term ‘Zangezur Corridor’ [a route to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan, which Baku demands Armenia not control this part of its sovereign territory] is unclear and unacceptable to us. Because, first of all, the Republic of Armenia has nothing to do with this term.
The fact that such a term is used is perceived in Armenia as a territorial claim against Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity..
Recently, I published an article on this issue, the main point of which is that we advocate for the opening of regional communications. And let me say that, first and foremost, we are in favor of opening regional communications because, in reality, we are the ones under blockade.
No other country in the region is under blockade. We have four borders, two of which are completely closed. And this fact itself shows how much we need and are interested in opening regional communications.
There are many references, including to paragraph 9 of the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020. But I want to draw your attention to a very important fact: in paragraph 9 of the trilateral statement, there is no mention of a corridor.
Moreover, there is much talk about the provision in the November 9 statement that the security of passenger and cargo transport through Armenia’s territory should be provided by third countries’ representatives and forces. This is not in the trilateral statement of November 9. Moreover, it states that the Republic of Armenia guarantees the security of the movement of goods, vehicles, and passengers. How can the Republic of Armenia guarantee security if it does not ensure that security itself?
But I also want to make the following point. The trilateral statement cannot be considered selectively.
For example, it mentions the exchange and return of prisoners of war, hostages, and other detained persons, but this issue has not yet been resolved.
Moreover, it is even more exacerbated by the ongoing trials in Baku, which, in our estimation, are staged. And prohibited measures, such as torture, are being applied, according to our data, and other prohibited means, etc.
The trilateral statement mentions ‘Nagorno-Karabakh.’ But Azerbaijan has long claimed that Nagorno-Karabakh does not exist. It speaks about the return of refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions, but after the trilateral statement, the number of refugees actually increased, and forced displacement occurred [more than 100,000 Karabakh Armenians].
Regarding communications: is the Republic of Armenia ready to provide a link between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic via its territory? Yes, of course, we are ready. And we made Azerbaijan a very concrete proposal on this issue, which, in our opinion, is not just a proposal but a solution to the problem of railway cargo transportation. And we are waiting for a response from Azerbaijan.
However, I want to draw your attention to the fact that, in general, including in the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020, there is no separate issue of ensuring transport links between the western regions of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. This agenda is included in the broader agenda of opening regional communications as a whole.
This means that Armenia and Azerbaijan should mutually open communications with each other, including internal ones, i.e., from Armenia to Armenia through Azerbaijan’s territory and from Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan through Armenia’s territory.
want to draw your attention to the fact that, for example, there is no railway connection from the northern regions of Armenia to Meghri, that is, the southern region, and this railway connection only passes through Azerbaijan’s territory, specifically the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. And we say that we are certainly ready to provide railway transportation and expect that similar communication will be provided to Armenia. In particular, a railway connection from Yeraskh to Meghri should be provided, as the mountainous terrain makes it difficult to build a railway from south to north through Armenia’s territory.
At the same time, in our understanding, this also means creating a railway connection from Azerbaijan to Turkey through Armenia’s territory and back, as well as creating road transport links, including from Azerbaijan to Turkey and back. This, in turn, means that Armenia can be connected to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia via rail and road through Azerbaijan’s territory. Of course, in this case, the opening of the Armenia-Turkey railway, etc., is also expected.
We are ready for these solutions. And it is unclear to us why Azerbaijan does not respond to these solutions but instead continuously tries to use this topic in the logic of escalation.
By the way, in my latest article, I also emphasized that if, under other conditions, infrastructure investments are needed in other cases, right now, with a political-legal decision, it is possible to ensure road transport from Turkey through Armenia’s territory to Azerbaijan via the Margara checkpoint, where the infrastructure is ready, and the roads are in good condition.
That is, all of this can be done today, and I publicly stated that we are ready to ensure such road transport. And all of this, the combination of these perceptions, we call the Crossroads of Peace [the Armenian government’s initiative for unlocking the region].
At the same time, we specifically chose this name for the project so that it would not cause any allergic reactions in any of our neighboring countries. And I think that this is the most direct reflection of our constructive position and our positioning.”
What is Armenia doing to secure the release of Armenian prisoners held in Baku? (Armenian newspaper Agos)
«Эта ситуация нас очень беспокоит. Сегодня в Азербайджане находится как минимум 23 пленных, заложников и других удерживаемых лиц. И мы пытаемся приложить все усилия для решения этого вопроса.
But we must understand that this is happening in a context where Azerbaijan is essentially using this factor as part of its logic and objectives for escalation.
In Armenia, it is said that the government is not making the necessary efforts to solve this problem. I generally understand this criticism. While the efforts the government is making are not yielding results, anyone can say that no efforts are being made.
The fact is that these efforts are mainly being carried out at the diplomatic level. Why? Because in this context, public statements must be very targeted and serve a specific purpose. Outside of certain cases, these public statements bring no benefit and, on the contrary, cause harm.
At the same time, there have been public statements about torture, visual evidence of the use of prohibited methods, which of course raises concern and is unacceptable. The government of Armenia has expressed a clear position on this matter.”
What is Armenia’s stance on the return of Azerbaijani refugees? (CNN Türk)
“There is a very important addition to your question.
Azerbaijan is actually raising the issue it calls ‘Western Azerbaijan.’ And Azerbaijan refers to approximately 60-70% of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia as ‘Western Azerbaijan.’
We say that there is no ‘Western Azerbaijan’ in Armenia. If you want to find or see Western Azerbaijan, it includes the regions of Gazakh, Akstafa, Kedabek, Kelbajar, Lachin, Zangilan, and Gubadli. Geographically, with some imagination, Nakhchivan could also be considered Western Azerbaijan.
They are trying to frame this within the logic of humanitarian issues, urging us to discuss this matter. But, I repeat, they are calling 60% of our sovereign territory ‘Western Azerbaijan.’ Therefore, this issue is not up for discussion for us, and it cannot be discussed by any country.
Generally, if we talk about the refugee issue, I’ve already mentioned that we even have a document about the return of refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas. In Armenia and the diaspora, there are refugees from Nakhchivan, Baku, Sumgait, the areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, Ganja, and so on. In our perception, this is simply a territorial claim against Armenia, and therefore we cannot discuss this issue.
Azerbaijan contradicts itself. How? Azerbaijan officially calls the period from 2021 onward the post-conflict period. Yet, they speak in the language of conflict every day.
These two discourses of Azerbaijan do not align with each other. Every day, it’s the language of conflict, aggressive rhetoric, and, if not every day, then very often, threats of force or the use of force. And the discourse of ‘Western Azerbaijan,’ which questions — let’s be frank — the very existence of the Armenian state. At the same time, there is an invitation to discuss. Sorry, but in my view, this is at least strange.”
Is there risk that while there is no peace with Azerbaijan, relations with Turkey will not be established? (T 24)
“I would not agree with the formulation that peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not visible on the horizon. I would say that constant attempts are being made to create a smokescreen along the entire horizon so that peace remains unseen. In reality, there are very important foundations for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Armenia and Azerbaijan, in essence, agreed to recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty based on the 1991 Almaty Declaration. This is what should be visible on the horizon.
Moreover, in the agreed articles of the peace agreement project, this fact is reaffirmed: the parties emphasize that they have no territorial claims against each other and mutually pledge not to make such territorial claims in the future.
The smokescreen is the discourse about ‘Western Azerbaijan,’ because if we have reached an agreement to recognize each other’s territorial integrity, there should be no discourse about ‘Western Azerbaijan.’
The smokescreen also includes the ongoing trials in Baku, which, in our perception, have one goal — to undermine the achievements we have made in the peace process. We have been negotiating for peace for four years, and we have results.
Yes, we understand the sensitivity and the specifics of the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This cannot be denied. But on the other hand, we also have [positive] processes in the relations between Armenia and Turkey.
When I spoke about developments in the relationship between Armenia and Turkey, I missed facts that I could have added. For two consecutive years, the Armenian Foreign Minister has participated in the Antalya Diplomatic Forum. After the devastating earthquake, the foreign minister visited the disaster zone in Turkey. We sent humanitarian aid. It’s good that we sent humanitarian aid, but it’s unfortunate that this happened as a result of such tragic events.
As for Turkey’s role, in my opinion, Turkey also has to make a choice. Because we hear that Turkey is making attempts — maybe we are misinterpreting the message. In our opinion, Turkey, at least based on the messages, stands for stability in the South Caucasus.
We see that Turkey, both at the presidential and foreign ministerial levels, is advocating for the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And if we correctly understand these messages, this also means a certain balance in Turkey’s relations in the South Caucasus. Or maybe we are misunderstanding it.”
