Armenia-Azerbaijan: The main obstacles on the way to a peace treaty
Trilateral Statement on Karabakh
It will soon be two years since the signing of the tripartite statement on the cessation of hostilities in the Second Karabakh War and on the main outlines of a future peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict.
This statement, signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on the night of November 9-10, 2020, could not of course claim to be a final, legally-binding document. It was drafted under extremely tenuous conditions and is therefore quite “raw” from a legal point of view. It is more of a “gentleman’s agreement”, rather like the faxed ceasefire agreement of May 12, 1994, and the signatories interpret its clauses differently.
Nevertheless, in international law there is a generally accepted principle that “Treaties must be observed” (“Pacta sunt servanda”) enshrined in the UN Charter, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and other documents.
Let’s try to figure out which points of this agreement have been fulfilled and which have not, and why.
Just before that, I must make one footnote: I will use the term “Nagorno-Karabakh” (NK), despite Azerbaijan’s claim that there is no such entity, although in the text of the tripartite statement signed by Ilham Aliyev, this term is mentioned four times.
So:
“1. A complete ceasefire and the end of all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are announced from 00:00 Moscow time on November 10, 2020. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, halt at their positions.”
Not done; there was no “full” ceasefire. As usual, the parties blamed each other for violations of the ceasefire. But the fact is that both in NK itself (Farrukh / Parukh height) and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, the ceasefire agreement has been violated repeatedly.
Azerbaijani troops have strengthened their positions and, according to Armenian media, in September 2022 even advanced more than seven kilometers into the territory of Armenia. That is, the condition “to remain in one’s positions” has not been observed either (the reasons for this are another topic).
“2. Agdam region to be returned to the Republic of Azerbaijan by November 20, 2020.”
Done. Now the main problem is how the “Caucasian Hiroshima” will be restored (Thomas de Waal’s expression). The government has its own projects not to the liking of Agdam’s inhabitants, but this is still a peacetime agenda.
“3. Along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor, a peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is to be deployed in the quantity of 1960 soldiers with small arms, 90 armored personnel carriers, 380 vehicles and special equipment.”
Done. True, no one can control the number of personnel and military equipment in the Russian contingent (I don’t write “peacekeeping”), but apparently, the Russian Federation does not yet have a particular desire to increase their number. There are plenty of other problems.
“4. The peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is to be deployed in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces. The term of stay of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation is 5 years with automatic extension for the next 5-year periods, if none of the Parties declares 6 months before the expiration of the period of intention to terminate the application of this provision.”
Here is one of the two main stumbling blocks. Each side interprets the expression “withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces” in its own way. By this Armenia understands its regular army and has already pledged to no longer send conscripts to NK and withdraw the remainder.
Azerbaijan, however, insists on the complete demilitarization of all Armenian armed formations, including those who call themselves the “Artsakh Defense Army.” The main argument: “The text says “Armenian”, and not the Armed Forces of Armenia.”
So far, this point has not been completed. But this is Azerbaijan’s first demand on the way to signing a peace treaty.
As for extending the mandate of the Russian contingent, there are three more years until 2025. Before that, the geopolitical situation in the region may change dramatically given the war in Ukraine — “and during this time either the khan or the donkey will die”, as Azeris say.
“5. In order to increase the effectiveness of control over the fulfillment of the agreements by the Parties to the conflict, a peacekeeping body is to be established to monitor the ceasefire.”
The strangest item; apparently done. But for two years no one has received any information or a press release from this Russian-Turkish monitoring group in the Agdam region. Even during the battles for the Farrukh / Parukh height, which is quite close to their office, they were silent. We are not even sure if they have a mandate to speak up.
“6. By November 15, 2020, the Republic of Armenia shall return the Kelbajar region to the Republic of Azerbaijan, and by December 1, 2020, the Lachin region. The Lachin corridor (5 km wide), which will provide a road between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and will not affect the city of Shusha, remains under the control of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation.
By agreement of the Parties, in the next three years, a plan will be determined for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor, providing a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, with the subsequent redeployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to protect this route.
The Republic of Azerbaijan guarantees the safety of movement of citizens, vehicles and goods along the Lachin corridor in both directions.”
Done. Kelbajar was returned, albeit belatedly, and the corridor was built earlier than planned, although somewhat to the south.
Here again there is disagreement about the term “corridor”. Armenia initially assumed that the Lachin corridor should not be under the control of the Azerbaijani army. But then it is not clear where it leads if the status of NK is not defined.
The redeployment was successfully done, the “route” was shifted to the south, bypassing the city of Lachin and the village of Zabukh, and still under the full control of the Russian contingent.
“7. Internally displaced persons and refugees shall return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the control of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.”
Not done; preparatory work has not even begun. Azerbaijan has already started to carry out its “Great Return” plan, moving the first group of internally displaced persons to the village of Agali in the Zangilan region, without any consultation with UNHCR.
According to the “letter” of the agreement, not only Azerbaijani IDPs, but also Armenian migrants from Shusha, Hadrut and nearby villages should fall under this clause. The UN has not yet commented on its absence on the issue of the return of refugees and is limited to UNESCO’s statements about the need to preserve monuments.
“8. An exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detainees and the bodies of the dead is required.”
Not done. Until now, several dozens of people have been held captive by Azerbaijan. Thirty-three are officially recognized; according to Armenia there are actually about eighty of them. When and under what circumstances they were taken prisoner is a matter of discussion, but periodically Azerbaijan releases a number of “detainees”, basically as bargaining chips.
“9. Unblock all roads in the region. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the security of transport between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic in order to organize the unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. Control over roads is undertaken by the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia.
“By agreement of the Parties, the construction of new roads will be provided connecting the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan.”
Not done. Another obstacle on the way to a peace treaty. Aliyev expected that Azerbaijan would be provided with an extraterritorial corridor through Meghri to the Nakhichevan exclave.
When Armenia flatly refused to do so, Azerbaijan signed a memorandum with Iran on two bridges across the Araks River. That is, it seems that Azerbaijan does not particularly insist on unblocking, and unblocking all roads in the region is more in the interests of Armenia and the Russian Federation.
In spite of all this, there is some light at the end of the tunnel. I would like to believe that the meeting and joint statement in Prague on October 6, mediated by EU President Charles Michel, will give fresh impetus to the peace treaty. However, the euphoria observed in the media and social networks about this is, in my opinion, premature and unfounded.
The recognition by the parties of “the territorial integrity of each other” was not formalized directly, but with references to the UN Charter and the Alma-Ata Declaration on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Recognition of the UN Charter does not at all mean a renunciation of territorial claims. Japan and Russia, India and Pakistan, and many other UN member countries recognize its charter, but have territorial claims against each other. In the Alma-Ata Declaration, along with the recognition of “territorial integrity”, “an inviolable right to self-determination” is also stipulated.
Another positive sign is the EU civilian mission along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Here the main danger lies in a possible zealous reaction by Russia and the desire to place a military mission of the CSTO there.
I don’t to end the article on a pessimistic note, but unfortunately, I can’t help sensing another round of hostilities to come before the 2025 deadline, when we will have to make a decision on the Russian contingent.
