Russia-Armenia conflict: Impact on Azerbaijan. Opinion from Baku
Russia-Armenia conflict
The tension between Russia and Armenia is often linked to the Azerbaijan factor. Armenia justifies suspending its participation in the CSTO by claiming the organization did not protect its member during the “invasion” by the Azerbaijani army.
Meanwhile, Russia accuses Armenia of not adhering to the terms of the trilateral statement from November 10, 2020, regarding the opening of communications between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.
According to experts from the Azerbaijani Center for South Caucasus Studies, the current “anti-Russian” actions by the Armenian authorities do not help normalize relations with Azerbaijan.
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The Azerbaijani Center for South Caucasus Studies (CSSC) published an analytical piece focusing on the current relations between Yerevan and Moscow, and how this relates to Azerbaijan.
“The duel between Yerevan and Moscow is rhetorical”
“Recently, global media has seen a rise in speculation about growing tensions between Russia and Armenia. However, in reality, neither side is taking any serious concrete steps to escalate tensions, and the ‘duel’ between Yerevan and Moscow appears to be purely rhetorical, which is quite evident.
It must be acknowledged that Pashinyan, a journalist by trade, has successfully run an information campaign, convincing many, especially his allies in the West, of Armenia’s plans to turn away from Russia. In return, he has gained certain aid and support.“
Current state of relations between the two countries
“To understand the current state of relations between the two countries, let’s examine how Russia is represented in different areas of life in Armenia:
- Military-political context: a military base in Gyumri, a joint air defense system, Russian border guards monitoring Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey, as well as at five to six points along the provisional border with Azerbaijan, and at the ‘Zvartnots’ airport;
- Economic context: Armenia’s nuclear energy, gas and electric distribution networks, Russia’s monopoly over the railways, annual trade turnover (which has almost tripled in the last two years reaching $7.3 billion), money transfers (which have increased more than fourfold in the last two years, approaching four billion dollars).
Moreover, Armenia continues to participate in integration projects where Russia plays a leading role:
- CSTO (a military defense alliance);
- EAEU (a customs and economic union);
- CIS (a platform for political dialogue).
Alongside this, Armenia remains Russia’s only strategic partner in the South Caucasus.”
Recent actions by the Armenian government
“Amid everything mentioned, to date, Pashinyan’s government has made only two, rather insignificant in scale, moves to curb Russian influence in Armenia:
Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO, but has not withdrawn from the organization. State officials do not participate in the organization’s events, Yerevan has not appointed its representative to the CSTO (but also has not annulled its representation), and does not sign documents adopted by the organization;
A request was sent to Moscow to replace Russian border guards with Armenian ones by August 1 at the ‘Zvartnots’ airport and to carry out the necessary handover tasks.”
“Armenian authorities’ steps do not serve to normalize relations with Azerbaijan”
“Interestingly, none of these steps relate to Azerbaijan. In other words, the current ‘anti-Russian’ actions of the Armenian authorities do not aid in normalizing relations with Azerbaijan.
In this context, two potential actions by Pashinyan’s government could improve relations with official Baku:
- Expelling Russian border guards from the provisional border with Azerbaijan, where they were stationed in 2021;
- Expelling Russian border guards who are monitoring the border with Iran.
Azerbaijan is not interested in the presence of foreign forces, including Russian border guards, on its borders. Despite this, as long as the actions taken do not conflict with Azerbaijan’s interests, official Baku will not respond to issues concerning relations between Moscow and Yerevan.”
