“Baku uses 'coercive diplomacy' against Yerevan” – Thomas de Waal
Thomas de Waal on Armenian-Azerbaijani talks
Thomas de Waal, a leading analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, spoke on Radio Azatutyun (Radio Liberty) on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the course of the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations to the journalist of the RS Yerevan Bureau, answered questions about the positions of the mediators, the functions and role of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in ensuring security in the region, and how events could develop.
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Radio Azatutyun: Shots are heard at the border every day. Do you think that Azerbaijan will use heavier force in Karabakh?
Thomas de Waal: I think that this situation is inherently unstable. I mean, unfortunately, violence happens all the time. It is often difficult to understand exactly what is going on. But I think there is also a diplomatic track going on in Washington at the moment. New talks are also expected in Brussels. It is for this reason that it is unfortunate that we are seeing this level of violence. But I do not think that we should expect a serious escalation from the Azerbaijani side.
As we have seen over the past two years, they have adopted a tactic that can be described as “coercive diplomacy”, that is, the use of both force and diplomacy.
This means that we sometimes see escalation, but it does not reach the level of full-scale war as long as negotiations continue.
Radio Azatutyun: Let’s get back to the negotiations. In this situation, do you see an opportunity, an option to leave Karabakh Armenian?
Thomas de Waal: Obviously, this is the key, the main issue. The ongoing negotiations between Baku and Yerevan are about some kind of bilateral agreement, and it is obvious that this government of Armenia has gone much further than previous governments in terms of recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
Yerevan is doing this under clear international pressure, Armenia is being told to come to terms with the fact that the idea of Karabakh’s independence has disappeared. But, on the other hand, it is also clear that no power in Armenia will ever completely abandon the people of Karabakh.
I think that over the past year, and maybe longer, the topic of negotiations is the following: what guarantees can be given to the people of Karabakh. And here it is obvious that we hear different things from different players. As for the Russians, Russian peacekeepers provide security. Maybe not at all ideal.
In conversations with the people of Karabakh, it becomes obvious that they are much less satisfied and more disappointed with the Russian peacekeepers. But they also know that Russians are better than nothing. And from the Americans and Europeans we hear talk about some kind of international mechanism, an international presence.
But of course it can mean a lot. For example, some international office of the OSCE or a certain security presence may be assigned.
I think it is obvious that behind the scenes negotiations are going on, invisible to us, precisely around this. This will be the main determining factor for the people of Karabakh. Do they see that their future is within Azerbaijan? They do not trust the authorities in Baku. And what kind of international presence or mechanism will be given to them?
We just don’t know the answer to this question. I would probably go even further and say that part of the problem is this: inside Karabakh we see different people with different answers. I am sure that if you asked Vitaly Balasanyan [Secretary of the Security Council of the unrecognized NKR] and Samvel Babayan [former Defense Minister], you would get different answers. And Ruben Vardanyan [a big businessman, former state minister of the unrecognized republic], I’m sure, would say: “We need to talk to the Russian peacekeepers.” Meanwhile, Samvel Babayan would say that “we can make a deal with the Azerbaijanis.” So part of that problem is also that we don’t have clarity.
Radio Azatutyun: But are there any international mechanisms capable of protecting the Karabakh Armenians?
Thomas de Waal: We see different types of international presence in different conflicts of the world. If we take Abkhazia before 2008, there was the so-called UNOMIG, a UN civilian mission, which was on the ground in parallel with Russian peacekeepers. This may be one of the formulas, although I do not know if Azerbaijan will accept it. We have also seen a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus for over 50 years. In the Balkans there is some small OSCE office for national minorities, and so on.
The problem after the 2020 war is that Azerbaijan is militarily, politically and geographically dominant. They simply control all the regions around Karabakh. They are in the position of dictating conditions.
So, I think the decision will indeed be made partly in Baku, partly in Moscow, partly in Western capitals and, I’m afraid, only last but not least in Yerevan.
Radio Azatutyun: By the way, there are optimistic forecasts in Armenia that things can even come to bringing in international peacekeepers. Is such a scenario possible in this atmosphere?
Thomas de Waal: Well, this is one of the scenarios. But if we listen to what the leadership of Azerbaijan consistently says, we will understand that they want the Russian peacekeepers to leave and no one to replace them.
We have not seen any talk of Western leaders that they will send peacekeepers there. So that’s one of the scenarios, but I don’t think it’s very likely.
In my opinion, this would be a stabilizing option. Azerbaijan could accept this international presence, this peacekeeping mission for a certain period, maybe 5 or 10 years, and this would stabilize the situation. But it is obvious that this is not what we hear from Baku.
Another problem here is that in Baku they feel that they need to hurry. They feel that the international situation is developing in their favor, because Russia is weak, its attention is focused on something else, it is not in a position to dictate terms. In addition, President [Turkish Recep] Erdogan is now re-elected, and the Europeans are also negotiating gas with Baku, although this will not last forever, because Europe intends to abandon hydrocarbon energy.
So in Baku they feel that they have a window of one or two years, during which they can get a rather favorable result.
Radio Azatutyun: So you think that Yerevan is not able to achieve this goal?
Thomas de Waal: I have already said that Yerevan is not the main decision maker in this matter.
Armenia’s playing card is mainly that he can say no to plans to open a road leading to Nakhichevan. This is a card that the Armenian side can play with. This is a rather negative card.
With her, Yerevan can say: if you want this road and railway communication to reconnect Nakhichevan with the territory of Azerbaijan, then you must cooperate with us, including cooperation on the Karabakh issue. But at the same time, it also involves the risk of the use of force by Azerbaijan. So this is not a very good option for Yerevan.
Radio Azatutyun: On the other hand, does the West offer these mechanisms? As you mentioned, Armenian-Azerbaijani talks were taking place in Washington these days. Then Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev will leave for Brussels.
Thomas de Waal: Yes, but the Washington version is focused primarily on one document. This is a bilateral document on the regulation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I don’t think the foreign ministers are really empowered to talk to each other about Karabakh. These powers are held by the leaders of the countries. So when they meet with Charles Michel in Brussels, they will also talk about Karabakh, and there will be attempts to come up with some kind of initiative.
But in Brussels, as we know, they cannot offer anything related to security. And this is the moment when the Russians come with the Moscow talks.
So we have these three different levels of negotiation. I think part of the problem is that although the formats of Washington and Brussels are connected, none of them is connected to the third level, the Russian one. And the Russian agenda, of course, let’s be blunt, is more about Russia, more about what Russia wants than about Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Radio Azatutyun: If Azerbaijan rejects any foreign intervention in the Karabakh issue, do you consider it possible to put pressure on Baku from the West?
Thomas de Waal: Negotiations will continue. I don’t think we’ll see pressure. Washington and Brussels sent messages to President Aliyev not to use any more force in Karabakh, which is one of the reasons why the use of force is rather limited.
President Aliyev is trying to squeeze Karabakh economically, using the Lachin road and so on, and not using large-scale force. Although, of course, we see cases of violence. So, in this sense, Washington and Brussels have some restraining influence on Baku. However, I would not say that they are now ready to exert strong pressure.
Radio Azatutyun: Why doesn’t Russia protect the Armenians and prevent the expulsion of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh?
Thomas de Waal: I think that this is the question that you should ask our Russian partners. They stationed a peacekeeping force there, but were unable to agree on a mandate. In most cases, they mainly acted as observers. The size of the Russian peacekeeping force may not have decreased much since 2020, but the quality of the mission has declined. Many officers, high-ranking officers left for Ukraine.
We hear from Karabakh that the peacekeepers are using this blockade for obvious business purposes, as they have done in other conflicts, importing food and goods and selling them to the people of Karabakh at a higher price. This is very cynical.
But I think that President Putin is now worried about other things, including the question of his own survival. We saw this during the rebellion organized by Prigogine. He also thinks about what to do with Ukraine and the West. I don’t think he has much time to think about the Caucasus at the moment.
Radio Azatutyun: Does this mean that they will soon leave Nagorno-Karabakh?
Thomas de Waal: I think that neither in Baku nor in Moscow at the moment there is an initiative to withdraw Russian peacekeepers. Most likely, in May 2025, the Azerbaijanis will veto the extension of the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces, so that they leave in November 2025. But before that, of course, a lot can happen.
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Tom de Waal on Armenian-Azerbaijani talks
