Arif Yunus: "'Western Azerbaijan' narrative is a political tool and a repetition of Armenia’s mistakes"
What does Western Azerbaijan narrative mean
The ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative, which refers to areas located within present-day Armenia, has in recent years been actively promoted by official circles in Azerbaijan. It has sparked widespread debate both within the region and internationally, and provoked strong criticism in Armenia.
JAMnews offers an analysis of the historical context behind this term, its potential political aims, and its impact on the peace process in the region. Azerbaijani historian and human rights defender Arif Yunus, who sharply criticises the narrative, shares his perspective.
He describes it as a “rhetoric of occupation” and argues that Azerbaijan is repeating mistakes once made by Armenia.
“They [Armenian authorities] created regional tensions with imaginary historical constructs like ‘Greater Armenia’ and ‘Western, Eastern Armenia’. Now Azerbaijan is making the same mistake, and this too is perceived as expansionist rhetoric. Such a policy is wrong and should not exist,” says Arif Yunus.
He also comments on Turkey’s possible role in promoting the narrative and its potential connection to the proposed Zangezur Corridor, a highly contentious issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
How Azerbaijani authorities explain ‘Western Azerbaijan’ term
The most recent comment on the topic came from Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aykhan Hajizade on 26 May 2025:
“President Ilham Aliyev’s references to ‘Western Azerbaijan’ should not be seen as territorial claims against Armenia. It simply means that historically, Azerbaijanis lived on those lands and made up the majority of the population.
References to the Western Azerbaijan community are not about territorial ambitions. It is a human rights issue — an intention to ensure the peaceful and dignified return of Azerbaijanis who were subjected to ethnic cleansing by Armenia.”
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Arif Yunus: “The topic of ‘returning Yerevan’ emerged during Heydar Aliyev’s era and was supported by opposition leaders”

Azerbaijani historian and human rights defender Arif Yunus views the term “Western Azerbaijan” as a relatively new phenomenon in Azerbaijan’s official discourse.
“Until the 1990s, the term ‘Western Azerbaijan’ did not exist in Azerbaijan’s political or public discussions.
It emerged in 1996 as part of the political strategy of Heydar Aliyev (former president, father of the current president, and recognised as a national leader — JAMnews).
It was a response to narratives popular in Armenian society about so-called ‘Eastern Armenia’ and ‘Western Armenia’, referring to present-day territories of Azerbaijan and Turkey.
So this narrative was not an attempt to restore historical memory, but rather a tool of political manipulation.
The term ‘Western Azerbaijan’ was institutionalised by a special decree in 1998. After that, certain organisations were formed.
However, they were mostly symbolic in nature. For a while, the topic drew little interest and was mainly relevant to Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia.
I remember that the first time the idea that we, Azerbaijanis, should ‘take back Yerevan’ was raised as a political issue by opposition politician Ilgar Mammadov (leader of the Republican Alternative Party [ReAl], former deputy chairman of the Party of National Independence of Azerbaijan, and himself originally from Armenia — JAMnews).
I recall a roundtable in Baku in 1999 on the topic of Karabakh. If I’m not mistaken, it was organised by the Aynanewspaper and included experts like Zardusht Alizadeh, Rauf Mirkadirov, Rasim Musabekov, and others.
The discussion was: “How can the Karabakh conflict be resolved?” Everyone offered different ideas. Then Ilgar Mammadov stood up and said: we must take back Yerevan.
We replied: let’s first get back Karabakh — then we can think about that.
At that time, the issue and the ideas associated with it mainly interested refugees from Armenia. The general public showed little interest.”
President Ilham Aliyev first brought this topic into focus in 2018.
He needed it, in part, because it was during a period of political confrontation with Ramiz Mehdiyev (who headed the Presidential Administration from 1994 to 2019 — JAMnews) and his then-powerful “Nakhchivan clan.”
At the time, Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia were expressing anger over the arrest of prominent figures from their ranks, such as opposition politicians Ali Insanov and Ilgar Mammadov. Discontent was growing within this large group of people. Ilham Aliyev needed their support, so he brought the topic into public discourse and put forward the idea that “Azerbaijanis must reclaim Yerevan.”
I remember that in Armenia, the reaction was very sharp. I also said then: this isn’t about you — this is about us. It’s an internal Azerbaijani matter.
It was tied to the elections, and at that moment Ilham Aliyev needed the backing of these people — those from “Western Azerbaijan.”
I said then: if Ilham Aliyev has raised this issue, it means Ali Insanov and Ilgar Mammadov will be released soon. And that’s exactly what happened. They were key political figures of that time.
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Arif Yunus: “This is a ‘response’ to Armenia’s territorial claims — and therefore a repetition of its mistakes”
According to Arif Yunus, the current intensification of this narrative in Azerbaijan should be viewed as a reaction to Armenia’s long-standing historical territorial claims, which have been promoted since the early 20th century.
He points to popular concepts in Armenian discourse such as “Eastern Armenia” and “Western Armenia”, referring to territories now within Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as the idea of “Greater Armenia”, which Wikipedia describes as stretching “from the Kura to the Jordan, and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Caspian.”
“But by using this narrative, Azerbaijan is merely repeating Armenia’s mistakes — following the same path. They [Armenian elites] created regional tension through fictional historical concepts like ‘Greater Armenia’ and ‘Eastern and Western Armenia’.
Now Azerbaijan is repeating the same mistake, and it is perceived as expansionist rhetoric. This kind of policy is wrong and should not exist.”
International analyst Thomas de Waal wrote in his book on Karabakh, Black Garden, that historical narratives in the South Caucasus often evolve as “mirror images” in response to one another:
“Historical narratives between Azerbaijan and Armenia are mirror reflections — they echo one another and are shaped as reactions to the claims of the opposing side. The term ‘Western Azerbaijan’ fits into this as a direct answer to Armenian narratives.”
“In the past,” Yunus recalls, “when I worked in the presidential administration of Azerbaijan (in the 1990s), narratives about ‘genocide’ and other similar ideas were mostly supported by marginal groups and were criticised within official circles.
Today, however, these narratives are state-funded and deliberately promoted.
The creation of organisations like the ‘Western Azerbaijan Community’, the spread of this ideology via state television, and the inclusion of the term in official documents show that the narrative has become a political tool.”
Armenia’s reaction
In Armenia, the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative is met with sharp criticism and is viewed as both historical falsification and a territorial threat. A 2023 statement from Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared:
“Azerbaijan’s ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative is an attempt to falsify history and represents a direct threat to Armenia’s territorial integrity. It is aimed at undermining peace negotiations in the region.”
Armenian historian and political analyst Richard Giragosian also sees the narrative as part of Azerbaijan’s revanchist policy:
“Azerbaijan’s rhetoric about ‘Western Azerbaijan’ mirrors Armenia’s former claims to ‘Greater Armenia.’ It is not used to seek historical justice but as a tool of political pressure and territorial ambition.
Armenia has learned from those mistakes and moved away from such narratives, while Azerbaijan is now following the same path.”
Arif Yunus considers it a positive step that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has distanced himself — since 2022 — from fictional historical narratives like “Greater Armenia” and “Western Armenia”:
“Pashinyan is trying to rid Armenia of historical fantasies and bring the country back to a realistic political agenda. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan is moving in the opposite direction and, through the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative, only reinforces expansionist rhetoric.”
“Western Azerbaijan’ narrative strengthens Turkey’s influence in the region”
Arif Yunus believes that by promoting this idea, Azerbaijan is drawing inspiration from Turkey’s neo-Ottoman policy. “This rhetoric aligns with Turkey’s strategy to increase its influence in the region,” he says.
A similar view is expressed by Armenian analyst Tigran Grigoryan:
“Azerbaijan’s ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative appears to be part of Turkey’s broader strategy to expand its regional influence. The term is not limited to Azerbaijan alone — it also serves to reinforce Turkey’s pressure on Armenia.”
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International concerns over the narrative’s negative impact on the peace process
The International Crisis Group, in its 2024 report, noted:
“Azerbaijan’s ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative heightens security concerns in Armenia and complicates peace negotiations. It casts doubt on Armenia’s territorial integrity and undermines regional trust.”
Matthew Bryza, an expert with the U.S.-based Atlantic Council, also emphasised the damage this narrative does to the peace process:
“Azerbaijan’s rhetoric around ‘Western Azerbaijan’ weakens peace talks and intensifies Armenian security fears. Rather than promoting stability, it increases tensions in the region.”
Arif Yunus: “West sees ‘Western Azerbaijan’ as threat to peace — but why didn’t it view ‘Eastern Armenia’ narrative same way?”
“Some international circles view the term ‘Western Azerbaijan’ as a threat and associate it with revanchist intentions in Baku. Yet they did not react when, for many years, terms like ‘Eastern Armenia’, which implied claims to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, were widely used in Armenia.
If the use of terminology based on one side’s historical memory is accepted, then why shouldn’t the other side be granted the same right?
International experience shows that such issues must be addressed through legal and political mechanisms, built on mutual trust and dialogue.
For instance, after the conflict between Croatia and Serbia, some Serbs were able to return. Similar processes also occurred after the Second World War between Poland and Germany.
These matters are often resolved through special commissions and a long-term process of trust-building.
If Azerbaijan is genuinely serious about initiating such a process, it must approach the issue thoughtfully and avoid turning it into a domestic political rhetorical tool.
In turn, Armenia must take a constructive position and show readiness to recognise mutual rights.
Only under such conditions can long-term, stable, and mutually beneficial relations be achieved.
Historically, Armenians lived in Azerbaijani cities — Baku, Sumgait, Ganja, and others. If Armenians believe they should return there, then the return of Azerbaijanis to their former homes in Armenia must also be made legally and socially possible.
However, this can only happen under two fundamental conditions:
- First, a peace agreement must be signed between the two countries.
- Second, the process must be carried out entirely on a voluntary basis.
If Azerbaijan officially raises the issue of the return of deported Azerbaijanis to Armenia, it should not be based on unilateral demands, but framed within a process of mutual compromise.
And this process also requires the creation of an appropriate social and legal environment in Armenia.” социальной и правовой среды в Армении”.
Could ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative used to push for opening of Zangezur corridor?
Could the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ Narrative Be a Means to Push for the Opening of the ‘Zangezur Corridor’?
The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed land route that could connect Azerbaijan to its exclave, Nakhchivan, but would need to pass through Armenian territory. Armenia insists that it will control the section of the road that crosses its territory, while Azerbaijan argues that the route should be fully extraterritorial and controlled by a “third party.”
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“Some analysts link the intensification of the ‘Western Azerbaijan’ narrative to Baku’s attempt to pressure Armenia on the issue of opening the Zangezur Corridor. But in my view, this is genuinely a matter of communications infrastructure,” says Arif Yunus.
Just as in the Soviet period, two railway routes could function within the South Caucasus network today: one heading toward Nakhchivan (via the Armenian town of Meghri), and the other from the north, through Azerbaijan’s Gazakh region.
These routes complement one another and could strengthen regional connectivity.
The key goal is for these routes to operate not unilaterally, but on a reciprocal basis — allowing Azerbaijani trains and vehicles to reach Nakhchivan, while also enabling Armenia to use the routes to access Russia, Iran, and other destinations.
Such an arrangement must be based on mutual benefit.
Armenia itself has repeatedly stated that it does not oppose the opening of transport routes through the region. If this is genuinely about relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, then it requires a bilateral approach that respects the rights of both sides.