Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty: Expectations and prospects for signing
Prospects for signing peace treaty with Azerbaijan
The signing of a peace treaty remains a key issue in Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. While experts believe the negotiations have reached their final stage, geopolitical factors and Baku’s strategic calculations are delaying the process.
Azerbaijan is in no hurry to make a political decision, waiting for more favorable conditions. Meanwhile, Armenia must defend its interests amid shifts in the global order. As a result, the peace treaty has yet to be signed, leaving the region’s future uncertain.
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Robert Gհevondyan, political analyst
Peace treaty at its final stage
“The currently available information does not provide a complete picture of the developments surrounding the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty. However, it is clear that the document is in the final stage of negotiations.Only two unresolved issues remain: the withdrawal of lawsuits from international courts and the exclusion of third-country representatives from the border [referring to EU civilian observers monitoring the situation on the Armenian side].
Even here, the parties’ positions are so close that there is hope for a resolution.”
Azerbaijan must make political decision
“The key factor holding back the signing of the treaty is the need for a political decision—primarily on Azerbaijan’s part. However, due to extreme geopolitical uncertainty, this step has yet to be taken. Baku has paused, waiting for developments on the international stage.
The return of Donald Trump to power in the U.S., the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and possible shifts in Russia’s influence in the region create uncertainty for Azerbaijan.
Baku wants to wait for conditions that would allow it to maximize its gains from the agreement. For instance, Azerbaijan may hope that reduced Western attention to the region or a strengthened Russian position could give it additional leverage over Armenia.”
Significance of peace treaty
“The peace treaty holds both practical and psychological value. It could formalize diplomatic relations, mutual recognition of territorial integrity, and the definitive end of the conflict. By signing the document, Armenia and Azerbaijan could appeal to the OSCE to dissolve the Minsk Group, symbolizing the conflict’s conclusion.
The OSCE Minsk Group was established in 1992 to mediate negotiations over the Karabakh conflict. Its members include Germany, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Belarus, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, with Russia, the U.S., and France serving as co-chairs. However, since the start of the war in Ukraine, the group has been effectively inactive due to disagreements among the co-chairing countries.
Nevertheless, a peace treaty will not resolve all issues—neighboring states will inevitably face new challenges in the future.”
Issues beyond treaty: Delimitation and communications
“The process of border demarcation and delimitation is being conducted separately from the peace treaty negotiations, and there has been some progress in this area. However, discussions on reopening regional transport routes remain stalled.
Armenia insists on equal conditions for reopening transport links, while Azerbaijan continues to push for the so-called ‘Zangezur Corridor’ on its own terms.
The peace treaty will not directly resolve these issues but could serve as a foundation for further progress in their settlement.”
Azerbaijan’s strategy and possible geopolitical scenarios
“For Azerbaijan, the peace treaty serves as a tool to formalize the current status quo. After the capture of Artsakh and Armenia’s recognition of the territory as part of Azerbaijan, Baku aims to secure its achievements on paper.
This would allow Azerbaijan to close the chapter on Armenia’s involvement in the Karabakh issue—but not the issue itself. The Artsakh question cannot be fully resolved, as there is a people, and that people has rights.
However, amid geopolitical instability, Azerbaijan is in no rush. Aliyev may be waiting for more favorable conditions in the future—such as forcing Armenia to renounce its right to appeal to international courts, amend its constitution in Baku’s favor, or impose restrictions on its foreign policy and military capabilities.
Such demands could become reality if key global players, such as the U.S. or Europe, lose interest in the region while Russia strengthens its position after resolving the Ukraine conflict.
Moreover, given Trump’s own strategic approach, he may tolerate the use of force by regional actors. Azerbaijan could exploit this and push for a corridor through Meghri—an extraterritorial route linking it to Nakhichevan. Meanwhile, if Russia fully reasserts itself in the region, it could strike deals with Azerbaijan on various issues at Armenia’s expense.”
Armenia’s position
“Armenia is resisting pressure. The issue of reopening transport links has been excluded from the peace treaty.
At the same time, Yerevan refuses to unblock routes under Azerbaijan’s terms—specifically, it rejects providing roads on Armenian territory that it would not control, as Baku demands. At the same time, Yerevan refuses to unblock routes under Azerbaijan’s terms. The Armenian authorities reject Baku’s demand to provide roads on their territory that they would not control.
Additionally, Armenia is standing firm on the two unresolved points of the treaty: the withdrawal of lawsuits from international courts and the exclusion of third-country representatives from the border.
As for the constitution, the Armenian authorities pledged seven years ago to amend it, but the process has stalled, allowing Azerbaijan to exploit the issue to its advantage. It remains unclear whether the reference to the Declaration of Independence will be removed from the constitution.
Armenia’s constitution currently references the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which, in its opening paragraph, cites a joint resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh from 1 December 1989 on the ‘reunification’ of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan views this as a territorial claim and demands constitutional changes. In Armenia, however, this is seen as a domestic matter. Now that the government has raised the prospect of a new constitution again, the opposition accuses it of complying with Baku’s demands.”
