Peace policy is dead. Beware the peace, Georgia! Blog by Medea Turashvili
Peaceful Politics in Georgia
Author: Medea Turashvili
This article was originally published on the blog on the website of the “Georgian Institute of Politics.” The material is reposted without changes. All rights belong to the “Georgian Institute of Politics.” Opinions expressed in the article belong to the author. Publication date April 3, 2025.
For several days now, Georgian society has been closely following the meetings of the parliamentary commission created by Georgian Dream, where high-ranking military and police officials who participated in the 2008 Russia–Georgia war are being questioned. The questions being asked clearly show an intent to accuse a specific individual.
Georgian Dream’s hatred toward former president Mikheil Saakashvili and his party, the United National Movement, is not new. The commission’s work could be dismissed as just another act of propaganda, if not for the goal of the investigative commission, which has reopened the 2008 case and launched its so-called “investigation.”
Whatever answers the summoned individuals give, the conclusion has already been drawn. It was voiced by Mamuka Mdinaradze on March 29:
“It has been established that the order to open fire was given by Mikheil Saakashvili,” he stated.
What is the goal of Bidzina Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream, and what kind of peace do they want to achieve in Georgia? What is Georgia’s peace policy today and can it provide the citizens of Georgia with peace and security?
After 2008, Georgia’s peace policy was based on three key pillars:
- De-occupation and non-recognition: Georgia’s goal was to prevent international recognition of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, encouraged by Russia, and to ensure the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territories. The involvement of Western partners was of crucial importance in this regard. For example, since 2018, under specific U.S. regulations, the government of any country that recognizes the independence of territories occupied by Russia or establishes diplomatic relations with them is not eligible for funding from the US budget.
- Confidence building and reconciliation within conflict-affected Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian societies: In the context of occupation and the status quo, Georgia aimed to rebuild relationships and trust within these divided communities in order to overcome alienation, encourage various forms of cooperation (professional, economic, cultural, educational, etc.), and thereby reduce the risk of renewed confrontation and conflict. For this purpose, the 2010 State Strategy on Occupied Territories was developed, along with an Action Plan for its implementation. Various incentive programs and mechanisms were introduced, such as the healthcare referral program, neutral travel and identification documents, simplified business registration, recognition of education received in the occupied territories, creation of platforms for civil dialogue, and more. Georgia’s Western partners supported this aspect of the peace policy and invested political, financial, and intellectual resources into it.
- European Integration: Georgia viewed the process of EU membership and alignment with Europe as one of the keys to resolving conflicts and building a unified European Georgia, where the rights, freedoms, and well-being of citizens would be protected regardless of their ethnic background.
Georgian Dream has abandoned all three of these directions.
As relations with strategic partners deteriorate and Georgia faces international isolation, it is possible that a new wave of recognition of the occupied territories by Russia’s partner states may begin. Georgia has lost all its allies who were advocating for de-occupation and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory.
At the same time, newly acquired partners such as China are pursuing ambiguous policies. For example, in the 2023 “Agreement on Strategic Partnership between China and Georgia,” there is no mention of China recognizing Georgia’s territorial integrity, even though the agreement clearly states that “Georgia firmly supports the One China policy.” It is also worth noting that China, along with the United Arab Emirates, traditionally abstains from supporting the UN General Assembly resolution on the return of internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.
The shift away from European integration and the pressure on civil society have undermined the peace policy and its core goals. Channels for direct dialogue have been reduced at all levels. The authorities, represented by Georgian Dream, have had no official or unofficial contact with Abkhaz and Ossetian counterparts or communities for many years. Direct dialogue has been maintained only through the efforts of civil society, and even then, only with the help of Western partners.
The unprecedented pressure on civil society and the labeling of civic activists as foreign agents have ultimately led to a complete breakdown in communication between the authorities and analysts on conflict and security issues, as well as with civil society representatives involved in dialogue and peacebuilding.
There is no longer any exchange of information or opinions; no political discussion is taking place. The activities of the Peace Fund, which, with the help of European partners, supported joint economic initiatives between Georgian and Abkhaz entrepreneurs, have been suspended. This was an important tool for cooperation between parts of society divided by conflict. It aimed to encourage economic ties along the dividing line and was in fact launched by the Georgian Dream government.
There has also been a serious failure in fulfilling another key task of peace policy—mobilizing and engaging international partners. Today, Western partners have severed ties with state institutions, including the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality.
For example, according to information from the Office’s official website, from September 1, 2024, to the end of March 2025, the State Minister’s Office held four meetings with international partners, three of which were with UN offices in Georgia.
By contrast, during the same period in 2022–2023, this government body held 28 meetings with diplomats and delegations from Western countries and organizations. This clearly illustrates the isolation of Georgian Dream, which directly affects the safety and peace in Georgia.
Georgia has never had a peace policy without the political, economic, and intellectual support of its Western partners. Accordingly, Georgia does not know what a peace policy looks like outside of cooperation therewith.
Georgia has no other knowledge or approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution apart from Western knowledge, methods, and frameworks. No other country or regional actor can play a similar role, nor do they show any interest in acting as a counterbalance to Russian dominance.
Despite all of this, Georgian Dream has radically shifted Georgia’s foreign policy course in a different direction. In an effort to generate interest in Georgia, it has bet on the East–West corridor — the Middle Corridor — under which Georgia is intended to become a transport route for Chinese or Central Asian goods headed to Europe. High-level meetings have increased, along with calls for cooperation with Central Asian countries, the United Arab Emirates, China, and others. Georgian Dream does not even rule out participation in the 3+3 format.
The 3+3 format brings together Iran, Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, with the goal of cooperation in security, economic, and transport sectors. Consequently, to the East–West corridor, the North–South corridor will be added, which will ultimately bring even greater economic benefits to businesses connected with Georgian Dream.
This foreign policy shift could have the following consequences for peace policy:
First. No partner — not even Turkey — can serve as a substitute for the West’s involvement in peacebuilding policy. This means that the vacuum in international engagement will again be filled by Russia.
Russia will once again take on the role of mediator between Abkhazians and Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians — as it did before 2008. It will launch pseudo-platforms featuring pro-Russian “public figures.” These “figures” will create the illusion of dialogue and cooperation in order to prove that the key to conflict resolution lies in Moscow.
At a time when Georgia is losing its Western partners, and the U. is scaling back its support for European security architecture — a serious challenge for Europe — the future of the international Geneva Talks and the EU Monitoring Mission is now in question. Russia has long sought to weaken these mechanisms, and today the Georgian Dream government is helping it achieve that goal.
Second. Russia will once again create opportunities for corruption, organized crime, and smuggling through Tskhinvali and Abkhazia. It’s possible that trade and economic activity along the dividing line with Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region may indeed increase, movement may be simplified, etc., but all of this will benefit not ordinary citizens, but specific corrupt, privileged individuals close to those in power.
Even today, the population in Gali faces constant problems bringing household goods into Abkhazia, while tons of agricultural products are transported across the Enguri Bridge without issue.
Third. The transport corridor through Georgia and expanded trade relations with Georgia — both via the Russia–Georgia border and along the occupation line — fall under Russia’s strategic interests, especially in the context of European sanctions. Russia has already restored the Sukhumi airport, is expanding infrastructure at the Ochamchire seaport, and has set up a parking area on the Enguri Bridge, which, according to local residents, is meant for “transit”.
In the Gali district, there are reports that movement across the Enguri Bridge will soon be restored and simplified. To fully activate trade and transport mechanisms, only one step remains: the restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia and, accordingly, the repeal of Georgia’s Law on Occupied Territories.
This is exactly the goal of Tea Tsulukiani’s commission: to prove that Saakashvili was responsible for starting the war, thus softening the legal and moral arguments behind the Russian invasion and laying the groundwork for restoring diplomatic and direct economic relations with Russia.
This is a win-win game for both Ivanishvili and the Kremlin: through trade and transport corridors and closer economic ties with Russia, Ivanishvili and his inner circle will gain more money and accumulate more capital. The Kremlin, in turn, benefits by bypassing sanctions and regaining levers of influence over Georgia.
In such a “peace,” it is only Georgia and its citizens who lose: living in the version of peace offered by Georgian Dream means stepping back into the same waters — Georgia would return to the conditions of 1997–2002, with conflict resolution once again falling under the Russian umbrella, except now with Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remaining intact.
What would remain of Georgia is a sovereignty and statehood handed over to Russia, a corrupt authoritarian regime, a shadow economy, and collapsed public institutions.
In conclusion, Georgian Dream has, over the past years, systematically and deliberately weakened Georgia’s peace policy, alienating all proponents of peacebuilding, both Western partners and Georgian civil society. These actions fully align with the Kremlin’s interests in the region. The desire to preserve power and personal economic interests of Ivanishvili and his closest allies has ultimately outweighed Georgia’s national interests — the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, security, and peace.
Sources:
[1] Program “A Step Toward a Better Future.” https://smr.gov.ge/ge/page/40/nabiji-uketesi-momavlisken[2] Interestingly, for example, in its “Strategic Partnership Agreement with Cyprus,” China affirms support for Cyprus’s territorial integrity.
[3] Author’s interview.
[4] Author’s interviews and observations.
[5] Author’s interview.
[6] For example, according to British media, the UK-based company Hunnewell Partners, owned by Irakli Rukhadze, the owner of Imedi TV and close to Ivanishvili, assisted one of Russia’s largest telecom companies and a Russian oligarch close to Putin, Roman Abramovich, in corrupt deals in Uzbekistan. See: https://bylinetimes.com/2025/03/31/moscows-ties-to-the-georgian-regime-ran-through-kensington-and-chelsea
