Assad's fall and new Middle East era: perspective from Baku
Azerbaijani analysts on Assad’s fall
In Syria, Assad’s 53-year regime has collapsed. Bashar al-Assad, who came to power after his father Hafez al-Assad, has already left the country and received asylum in Moscow along with his family.
How will the change of power in Syria, resulting from a coup, shape the country’s future? What impact will these developments have on the geopolitical situation in the Middle East, and how will the new balance of power in the region be managed?
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Experts from the Azerbaijani analytical center “View on the East” have analyzed the situation surrounding these issues.
Division of power among Syria’s internal forces
“It’s wise not to rush predictions regarding post-Assad Syria. Recent events have once again demonstrated that radical changes in the Middle East can unfold within just a week.
The main question now is when and between whom the power struggle in Damascus will begin. The primary goal of uniting opposition groups, representing vastly different ideologies and interests, was the overthrow of Assad. In this regard, these groups will inevitably turn on each other in the fight for power after Assad, and those days are not far off.
Secular, Sunni, Salafist, Takfiri, Christian, Druze, Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, and other opposition groups, most of which are armed, must find common ground with the Alawite elite, which has held political and economic power for 50 years, and be capable of forming a transitional government.
It is clear that an initial agreement existed between certain factions within the government and the opposition, which played a key role in Assad’s swift overthrow.
The transitional government will also need to strike a balance between foreign powers and the military presence in Syria. A multi-faction transitional government and the inevitable constitutional debates are unlikely to proceed without bloodshed.”
However, it would be naive to expect a pluralistic democratic system in Syria that includes all groups.
In three examples of the “Arab Spring” process, governments were overthrown after extremely bloody civil wars: Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Following the collapse of central governments in Libya and Yemen, there were no forces left to control the armed groups that had grown stronger during the war, and the fragmentation of these countries became inevitable.
As bitter as it may be to say, under current conditions, only a new dictator can preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and unitary structure. Otherwise, Syria faces a Libyan scenario.
So, who can become Syria’s new dictator? Many point to Abu Mohammad al-Golani, the leader of HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham).
Golani is indeed a unique figure. His opportunistic career, which began in ISIS and evolved through al-Nusra, reached its peak in HTS. Today, Western media’s attempts to portray him as a moderate political leader from his jihadist past further promote Golani’s candidacy.
However, it is worth being skeptical about Golani’s ability to lead Syria. History shows that revolutions follow a consistent principle: they often devour their own architects. Golani, having played a key role in Assad’s overthrow, is an obvious target for many. In this sense, he may become one of the revolution’s first casualties.
In short, it is difficult to be optimistic about Syria’s future after Assad.”
New era for the Middle East and foreign powers in the region
“The end of Assad’s rule marks the beginning of a new era for both Syria and the Middle East. Undoubtedly, the primary beneficiary of recent developments is Turkey. Erdoğan managed to create favorable conditions for his country, choosing the right moment and decisive actions amid Syria’s shifting strategies. Of course, the role of Hakan Fidan, the direct executor of Turkey’s Syrian strategy, should also be emphasized.
The Assad dynasty’s biggest foreign policy mistake, spanning half a century, was building its relations with neighboring Turkey on miscalculations.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Hafez al-Assad fully supported the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, designated as a terrorist organization in Turkey) and sought to use terrorism as leverage in relations with Turkey. Although Hafez al-Assad was forced to expel Abdullah Öcalan (the PKK leader currently imprisoned in Turkey) from Syria in 1998 under Turkish pressure and a military ultimatum, Syria’s “PKK strategy” led Turkey to view its southern neighbor as a constant threat and seize the first opportunity to overthrow the Assad family.”
It is no coincidence that during the “Arab Spring,” when Assad’s regime began to falter, the heaviest blows came from the north – from Turkey. Instead of seeking an agreement with neighboring Turkey, Bashar al-Assad continued his conflict with Ankara and relied on the support of external powers such as Russia and Iran.
However, unlike his father, Bashar lacked experience and missed the opportunity to ease tensions with Turkey at the right moment. This mistake – rejecting Ankara’s proposals for normalizing relations in recent months, amid the weakening positions of Russia and Iran – proved fatal for Assad.
The situation that will emerge after Assad’s overthrow, specifically the likely partition of Syria, is expected to reveal significant dangers for Turkey. This topic warrants a separate discussion. Nonetheless, the fall of the Assad family is a crucial victory for Turkey’s reputation.
Assad’s fate serves as a message to those who aim to exclude Ankara from the regional configuration and to those who attempt to neutralize Turkey through external forces. This message should be carefully analyzed, especially by the Kurds who aspire to establish a state under the auspices of Greece, Armenia, and the United States.”
