Anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia stronger than after 2008 war, but why? Opinion

Anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia

Political scientist Gia Nodia discusses why anti-Russian sentiment is more visible in Georgia today than it was in 2008, after the August war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Obviously, anti-Russian sentiment against Russians who have relocated to Tbilisi and not only the Russian state is now much stronger than after the 2008 war.

No matter how much we stand in solidarity with Ukraine, a direct attack on Georgia was something else. In principle, we should have been more angry at the Russians back then. What explains this?

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A superficial explanation might be that there hasn’t been a Russian “invasion” in such numbers since that war, so we didn’t have it before our eyes. This is also a factor.

However, I think the main reason is internal politics: at that time many people hated the government for various reasons, but no one could call it pro-Russian.

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Obviously, there was a fear of new Russian aggression, but no one was afraid that the Georgian government would encourage and support Russia’s aggressive policy towards us.

Therefore practically no one objected to the creation of a visa-free policy for Russian citizens and the promotion of their tourism. No one considered this a “pro-Russian” step (in my opinion, quite rightly), because they did not expect pro-Russian steps from Saakashvili.

And now we have a government whose “pro-Russianness” is becoming more and more visible and which supports only ritual pro-Westernism. The government is increasingly reliant on people for whom its pro-Russianness is not at all a disadvantage.

So, since we do not believe that the government is motivated to protect us from political (and not only military) aggression from Russia, we feel much more vulnerable to Russia and the Russians.

This feeling of insecurity gives rise to a feeling that any Russian couple sitting in a cafe is part of an occupation project.

Whether the Russian “invasion” constitutes a real threat, or how they should be treated, is a completely different question. I am not writing about this (I also support the introduction of a visa policy for Russian citizens – but this is a purely theoretical issue under the current government).

I’m just trying to understand why our spontaneous psychological reaction to meeting a Russian is much stronger today than it was after the 2008 war.

I will therefore repeat what I have said here several times: no matter how we evaluate the “invasion” of Russian citizens it is still secondary to a more strategic problem – to have the kind of power that we have now.

Anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia