'Time bomb lies beneath Baku's demands,' says Armenian analyst
Azerbaijan interested in prolonging conflict
“This is not a new approach. In the past, too, whenever progress was made, complications and provocations from the Azerbaijani side would follow,” said Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan, commenting on the preconditions Baku introduced immediately after the final text of the peace agreement had been agreed upon.
He believes that once the agreement is signed, the risk of escalation from Azerbaijan will decrease, as the issue is under international scrutiny. Hovhannisyan announced that 10 international organizations and 58 countries had welcomed the conclusion of talks on the text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty — including all five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the US, UK, France, China, and Russia.
Asked by journalists whether any of these countries had expressed a willingness to act as a mediator, the deputy foreign minister said he could not answer that question at this time.
Meanwhile, political analyst Narek Sukiasyan noted that based on international reactions, many countries appear “detached” from the core of the issue and do not view it as a priority:
“They’re simply interested in getting rid of a ‘headache’. The West is preoccupied with its own problems — the crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations, efforts to resolve the war in Ukraine, and internal challenges. I think it came as a relief for them to believe that this distant and insignificant conflict may soon drop off their agenda.”
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“Third-party forces refer to military presence” – Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister
During today’s briefing, Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan reiterated that Yerevan is ready to discuss the details of signing a peace agreement. However, no response has yet come from Baku. Hovhannisyan stated that Yerevan remains committed to advancing the peace process, including through international engagement.
He also addressed the agreement between Yerevan and Baku to exclude third-party forces from the border. This issue has sparked concern in Armenia, as it is perceived as potentially leading to the withdrawal of the EU observer mission. Many in Armenian society credit European observers—who patrol the border from the Armenian side—for maintaining stability.
“The idea is that the exclusion of third-party forces should be mutual, including in the future. And ‘third-party forces’ typically refers to military presence. To what extent can the EU’s [civilian] observer mission be considered military?” Hovhannisyan said.
Asked whether there is confidence that Baku will not demand the withdrawal of the EU observers, he responded:
“At the moment, we can’t be fully confident about anything. Logic suggests there should be no such demands, but it’s hard to speak in terms of certainty.”
In Hovhannisyan’s view, there is no point in discussing the potential withdrawal of observers from the Armenian border for now. This issue would only arise after the peace treaty is signed:
“The peace process is not moving forward that quickly. The mission’s mandate is for two years. Of course, if we sign and ratify the agreement, if there are genuine signs of peace, we can then discuss the EU mission’s mandate. Patrolling the border isn’t the only option. The mandate also includes fostering and strengthening trust between the countries.”
He believes that, in a positive scenario, it will be possible to find the “right model” to continue working with the European observers.
Hovhannisyan declined to go into other details of the agreement but assured that the document provides for bilateral mechanisms to resolve all outstanding issues.
Expert commentary
Political analyst Narek Sukiasyan notes that the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiation process continues to follow the same logic as in recent years:
“For the past 4–5 years, Azerbaijan has been pushing forward its maximalist demands, while Armenia has tried to delay their implementation where possible, aware that any strong resistance could lead to escalation. Yerevan makes concessions when delaying or resisting seems impossible. At every stage, it gives in a little more in an effort to postpone an impending escalation.”
Sukiasyan welcomes any step toward progress—but urges a clearer understanding of what that progress actually entails. He points out that Baku presents every breakthrough as its own achievement, claiming that all decisions are made on its terms:
“This doesn’t guarantee a positive peace. It doesn’t rule out military solutions to disputes. What we’re seeing is the politicisation of issues with the sole aim of humiliating the other side and halting its development. If you’re being forced to abandon your means of protection—even your right and resources for self-defence—what kind of development, what kind of positive peace are we really talking about?”
According to the analyst, “there’s no real sign of peace yet.” As evidence, he points to the ongoing belligerent rhetoric and the preconditions Azerbaijan presented even after the peace agreement text had been finalised. Baku has stated it will only sign the agreement once Armenia amends its constitution and the OSCE Minsk Group is dissolved.
The political analyst is convinced that Azerbaijan knows full well the constitutional demand is a dead-end:
“This is precisely why they raise the issue—to prevent the conflict from being resolved. Baku has no interest in peace. It benefits from the continuation of the conflict, which helps solve numerous internal and external problems.”
Narek Sukiasyan suggests that even if Armenia’s authorities agree to the constitutional changes Baku demands, Armenian citizens are unlikely to support them. He warns that Baku’s demands carry a hidden trap:
“Azerbaijan could then say, if the referendum results don’t satisfy them: ‘Look, the Armenian people haven’t abandoned their revanchism—they need to be punished, taught a lesson.’ And they would use this as a casus belli, a formal pretext for war.”
Azerbaijan claims the Armenian constitution contains territorial claims. In reality, the issue lies not with the Constitution’s text itself, but with the Declaration of Independence it references. The very first paragraph of the declaration mentions the joint resolution of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh dated 1 December 1989 “On the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh”—this is what Azerbaijan considers a territorial claim.
The analyst also recalls recent statements by Armenia’s prime minister about being ready to sign the peace agreement:
“These were appeals not to start a war because the current situation offers no real grounds to believe in peace. I don’t think the Armenian government actually believes that signing this document will usher in an era of peace. These messages are mostly aimed at a domestic audience.”
