Opinion: 'If Baku cared about security, it could have negotiated practical guarantees with Yerevan'
Azerbaijan opinion on peace with Armenia
Commenting on Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s article about opening transit routes through the South Caucasus, Azerbaijani peace activist and researcher Sevinj Samadzade stated that “if security were the main concern, Baku could have negotiated practical guarantees with Armenia.”
On March 4, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan published a policy article in Armenpress outlining ways to open transit routes in the South Caucasus.
Both Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry and independent experts consider Pashinyan’s proposals superficial, arguing that they fail to address key questions, including who will control these routes and what role Russia, mentioned in the trilateral intergovernmental statement, will play.
Azerbaijan’s peace strategy: Technical issues or strategic advantage?
According to Sevinj Samadzade, Azerbaijan‘s refusal to sign a peace treaty is not due to unresolved technical issues but rather its desire to maintain a strategic advantage.
She argues that in the current global landscape—where the liberal world order has collapsed and transactional diplomacy (based on short-term benefits rather than long-term commitments and values) dominates—Azerbaijan seeks to solidify its regional hegemony through militarism.
“By keeping Armenia in a state of constant weakness, Baku believes it can extract further political, economic, and territorial concessions, dictating terms without committing to a lasting peace.
This approach aligns fully with Azerbaijan’s geopolitical strategy. By maintaining control over infrastructure, trade routes, and energy corridors, Baku seeks to solidify its role as the dominant power in the South Caucasus.
In essence, Aliyev’s regime is not interested in signing a peace treaty, as doing so would limit Baku’s ability to use military threats and diplomatic pressure as leverage,” Samedze argues.
According to the researcher, unresolved issues—such as the withdrawal of third-party forces from the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the renunciation of legal claims against Azerbaijan in international courts—are deliberately left open by Baku to prolong negotiations and weaken Armenia’s sovereignty.
She also highlights Azerbaijan’s double standards: while demanding the suspension of the EU monitoring mission in Armenia and the country’s demilitarization, Baku continues to strengthen its military-strategic partnerships with Turkey and Israel.
“This demonstrates that the calls for demilitarization are solely targeted at Armenia.
“Azerbaijan’s demand for Armenia to drop its legal claims is an attempt to evade international accountability for ethnic cleansing and war crimes.
The so-called ‘Zangezur Corridor’ is not merely a logistical project but an attempt by Azerbaijan to establish extraterritorial control over Armenian territory.
None of these issues are true obstacles to peace—they are part of Azerbaijan’s hegemonic strategy, allowing Baku to maintain political pressure on Armenia.”
Suspension of EU mission and legal claims against Azerbaijan
According to Sevinj Samadzade, Azerbaijan’s primary objectives are to secure its status as the dominant power in the South Caucasus, ensure the stability of Aliyev’s regime, and turn regional energy and trade routes into instruments of geopolitical influence.
She argues that delaying peace allows Azerbaijan to use military threats as a diplomatic tool while reinforcing internal repression.
“The Aliyev regime consistently employs military rhetoric to suppress domestic opposition, portraying those who protest against the political system as ‘traitors.’ Signing a peace treaty could weaken this mechanism of control.”
Furthermore, Azerbaijan seeks to strengthen its economic and political leverage by expanding its strategic role as an energy supplier to the European Union and integrating into major geopolitical projects such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s North-South Corridor, and Turkey’s Middle Corridor.
At a time of shifting global power dynamics—especially amid the war in Ukraine and the rise of multipolar competition—Azerbaijan aims to consolidate its position by keeping the conflict unresolved and extracting maximum concessions from various sides.”
Delaying peace process: Strategy in domestic and foreign policy
The researcher argues that while Azerbaijan’s strategy is largely based on pressure and coercion, its delay tactics can be considered logical from a realpolitik perspective. In a world where international institutions have weakened and legal norms have eroded, Azerbaijan seeks to leverage its military advantage to force Armenia into a peace agreement on more favorable terms.
“From a security standpoint, Baku believes that by prolonging the peace process, it can secure stronger guarantees for the demilitarization of borders and transit routes.
At the same time, Azerbaijan can use its energy exports to extract political concessions, and the delay strategy further strengthens this position.
On the domestic front, postponing the peace process helps Aliyev’s regime maintain internal legitimacy by relying on nationalist rhetoric.
In the short term, this tactic may benefit Baku and Aliyev, but the lack of long-term stability will lead to persistent regional tensions and cast doubt on Aliyev’s ‘lifetime’ legitimacy.”
“Azerbaijan’s position on this issue shows that it wants conflict to continue”
Sevinj Samadzade points out that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal—allowing Turkish transport vehicles to handle shipments if Azerbaijani drivers feel unsafe in Armenia—could be an acceptable compromise for Baku.
“However, there is a high likelihood that Azerbaijan will reject this proposal because its primary goal is not just ensuring safe transit, but gaining full control over the ‘Zangezur Corridor.’ If Azerbaijan’s real concern were the security of cargo transportation, it would accept such a compromise.”
She argues that by rejecting this proposal, Baku reveals its true objective—to use security and logistics issues as tools of political pressure.
“This aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of leveraging transportation infrastructure as a strategic tool to expand its regional economic and geopolitical influence.
Azerbaijan’s stance on this issue shows that prolonging the conflict serves its political interests, and the transit dispute is merely a component of a larger hegemonic strategy.
If security were the primary concern, Baku could have negotiated practical guarantees with Armenia.
However, its insistence on third-party control—especially by Russia—proves that Azerbaijan’s true goal is not safe transit.
More broadly, Azerbaijan’s ruling elite acts as a ‘loyal partner’ to imperialist powers—Turkey, Russia, China, and the West—prioritizing the survival of its regime over regional stability, prosperity, and human security.
For this regime, controlled instability is more beneficial than a fully negotiated peace treaty.”
Context
In September 2020, a 44-day war broke out between the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan regained control over parts of Karabakh and seven surrounding districts.
On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a localized military operation in Karabakh. On September 28, the separatist “president of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)” Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree dissolving the “republic”, linking the decision to the situation following Azerbaijan’s offensive.
On October 15, 2023, President Ilham Aliyev declared in Khankendi that Azerbaijan had fully restored its sovereignty, the Karabakh issue was resolved, and the conflict was over.
Currently, 14 individuals are under arrest in Azerbaijan, including former separatist “presidents” of Karabakh Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, and Arayik Harutyunyan, former “foreign minister” Davit Babayan, “parliament speaker”Davit Ishkhanyan, and generals Levon Mnatsakanyan and Davit Manukyan, who are now on trial in Baku.
However, a formal peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia has yet to be signed.
