Azerbaijani-Russian relations: How downed plane sparked geopolitical conflict

A partner piece from JAMnews and Azerbaijani outlet Meydan TV

The plane crash that occurred in December 2024 dealt a serious blow to Azerbaijani-Russian relations. The rise in diplomatic tensions between Baku and Moscow in the aftermath of the incident was accompanied by growing ideological confrontation.

Amid the fallout, various interpretations emerged concerning the Kremlin’s rhetoric, Azerbaijan’s response, and the future of bilateral relations.

On 25 December 2024, a passenger plane operated by Azal en route from Baku to Grozny was shot down by Russian air defence systems. The incident, which claimed the lives of 38 people, caused deep concern both within Azerbaijani society and among political circles.

On 29 December, President Ilham Aliyev issued a strong statement demanding an apology from Russia, compensation, and the punishment of those responsible.

Ilham Aliyev: “The Russian side must apologise, admit guilt, and pay compensation to the Azerbaijani state, the injured passengers, and the crew members. These are our conditions.”

Three days after the incident, Russian President Vladimir Putin apologised during a phone call with Ilham Aliyev. However, Azerbaijan’s demands were not fully met.

In the first days following the crash, Azerbaijani media promoted the narrative of an “unidentified cause.” Only after Russia’s responsibility became undeniable did the tone shift. Outlets began issuing warnings to Russia and calling for compliance with Azerbaijan’s demands:

AZTV: “Instead of acknowledging its responsibility, the Russian side either threatens and insults Azerbaijan through the media or summons our ambassador to the Foreign Ministry…”

Public Broadcaster: “Azerbaijan is already preparing to take Russia to international court. Our pressure on Moscow is increasing.”

Public Broadcaster: “Azerbaijani-Russian relations are facing their most strained period in the last 30 years.”

Public Broadcaster: “From the very beginning, there has been an ambiguous stance within the Russian government towards its relations with Azerbaijan.”

Public Broadcaster: “We didn’t expect any positive steps from Moscow…”; “One of the greatest fears of authoritarian leaders is an attempt on their life, a threat to their personal safety.”

Journalist and political commentator Rauf Mirkadyrov believes Azerbaijan’s tough stance toward Moscow may be partly driven by concerns for the president’s personal security.

Around the same time, reports began circula]-ting in Azerbaijani society about a threat to President Ilham Aliyev’s life. When the AZAL passenger plane was shot down, Aliyev himself was en route to Russia to attend a CIS summit.

The presidential aircraft, which took off almost simultaneously with the downed passenger plane, was immediately redirected and returned to Baku.

“Reports of GPS malfunction on the presidential aircraft have almost been officially confirmed,” Rauf Mirkadyrov told Meydan TV.

“Even while the president’s plane was in the air, Israel’s foreign ministry allegedly contacted him and advised him to return to Baku due to a serious threat.

In general, one of the greatest fears of authoritarian leaders is an attempt on their life — a threat to their personal safety. Authoritarian leaders tend to take such threats very seriously. Sometimes they exaggerate non-existent threats and turn them into major crises.”

It is believed that Aliyev’s anger stemmed specifically from the perceived threat to his life — prompting him to mobilise his media resources against Russia.

Tensions between the two countries soon escalated beyond rhetoric. The “Russian House” in Baku — which, according to Rossotrudnichestvo head Yevgeny Primakov, was “solely engaged in humanitarian cooperation” — was shut down over accusations of espionage.

Although the government did not launch legal proceedings over the alleged discovery of a “spy office” in the capital, the issue became one of the most widely discussed topics.

At the same time, pro-government media also announced that Russian-language schools in Azerbaijan would be closed — though this claim was later not confirmed.

“The Azerbaijani authorities often use their own citizens as bargaining chips”

Professor Jamil Hasanli views the situation as populist posturing:

“Who decided that the ‘Russian House’ would be located in the city centre? Aliyev himself. As for the Russian language — Aliyev has proudly stated that around one million pupils are currently studying in Russian in our secondary schools.

Let’s say you’re reporting to Putin that a million pupils are learning Russian, and that there are about 327 Russian-language schools. These children are now in 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th grades. What will happen to them if the schools are shut down?

Aliyev simply wants to expand his autonomy under the current circumstances and reduce his dependency on Russia.”

According to Hasanli, whenever international tensions flare, the Azerbaijani government responds with internal repression:

“When ties with Iran worsen, they arrest Islamists. When tensions rise with Russia, they start hunting for Russian spies. When relations sour with the West, they arrest people who promote Western values — those who hold even moderately democratic views.

The Azerbaijani authorities tend to use their own citizens as bargaining chips.”

“Time to respond firmly”

Russian media — particularly pro-government outlets — adopted a sharply hostile tone toward Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the incident. Published articles claimed that Russia bore no real responsibility for the plane crash, suggesting instead that it was caused by a natural disaster.

In response to what was described as “Aliyev’s arrogance” and the closure of the Russian House in Baku, commentators proposed retaliatory measures — such as shutting down businesses owned by Azerbaijani entrepreneurs, including Food City and Sadovod, two major food markets in Moscow linked to God Nisanov and Zarakh Iliev, both natives of Krasnaya Sloboda in Azerbaijan.

Some went further, suggesting the deportation of Azerbaijanis living in Russia without residency permits, or conscripting them into the war in Ukraine. Russian MP Nikolai Valuyev posted the following on his Telegram channel:

“Now is the perfect time to dismantle the Aliyev diaspora in Russia — strip them of their businesses (plainly put, take them away), find a pretext and seize their large assets. Those who have Russian citizenship should be registered for military service and sent to the front.

If they refuse — revoke their citizenship. Those without Russian passports should be thoroughly checked for legal residency status. No basis — deport. Introduce a visa regime with Azerbaijan. It’s time to act like a sovereign power, not a doormat!

After three years, it should be obvious that kindness is seen as weakness. It’s time to respond harshly.”

Following the closure of the Russian House, Azerbaijan’s ambassador in Moscow was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry and handed an official note. In a reciprocal move, Russia’s ambassador in Baku was also summoned by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry. In response to his statements, MP Nikolai Valuyev was declared persona non grata by the Azerbaijani government and banned from entering the country.

“What should we do with Aliyev?”

Jamil Hasanli: “A meeting of Russia’s Security Council was recently convened, and one of the topics reportedly discussed was relations with Aliyev — essentially, ‘What should we do with Aliyev?’

There were many interesting points raised. For example, it was noted that the volume of remittances from Russia to Azerbaijan remains significant. Although it has halved compared to previous years, it is still substantial.

Another, more dangerous issue reportedly raised at the Security Council meeting was the alleged violation of Lezgin minority rights. What does this suggest? These Security Council meetings are usually closed. But the leaks — the statements by various individuals and officials — appear to be aimed at exerting pressure on Azerbaijan.”

Political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin, speaking to Caucasian Knot, described Baku’s frustration with Russia’s handling of the plane crash as “the last straw.”

“In reality, Aliyev is constructing a modernised authoritarian regime, one that is highly sensitive to any foreign cultural or political influence — whether from the north, the west, or the south. Perhaps the only exception is his relationship with Turkey,” he said.

According to Oreshkin, this same mindset lies behind the closure of the American USAID office.

“Aliyev is concerned with Azerbaijan’s sovereignty — and more importantly, with his own political status as the sole ideological figurehead. Any competing ideological influence is unacceptable to him.

So, the closure of the Russian House is a natural outcome of Azerbaijan’s current policy. After all, it wasn’t just a cultural institution — it also served as a centre of political influence, pro-Putin and in some ways neo-Soviet,” Oreshkin said.

Jamil Hasanli: “Aliyev is playing to the West, but Russia doesn’t want to let him go”

Professor Jamil Hasanli described the current conflict as largely theatrical.

In his view, Ilham Aliyev is appealing not to a domestic audience but to the West in this particular case:

“Undoubtedly, Aliyev often plays to his domestic base on such issues. But in this case, involving Russia, his rhetoric is aimed more at the West.

Essentially, through this process, Aliyev was building the infrastructure for future cooperation with the West — laying the groundwork and signalling: ‘I’m not Russia’s man, as you might think.’ That’s the real aim.”

Political analyst Elkhan Shahinoglu believes that Russia only issued a partial apology after the plane crash, and that the key demands — punishment of those responsible and compensation — remain unmet:

“There was an incomplete apology, and no action was taken to compensate the victims or hold anyone accountable. Recently, a Russian insurance company did say it would allocate something to the families of the victims and the injured.

But even that hasn’t moved forward. As long as the situation remains like this, relations between the two countries cannot be fully normalised.”

Rauf Mirkadyrov: “Azerbaijan’s policy is situational”

Journalist and political analyst Rauf Mirkadyrov describes Azerbaijani-Russian relations as “situational and interest-driven”:

“Remember the ups and downs in our relations with Iran? Sometimes they improve, sometimes they deteriorate, and sometimes Iran is declared an enemy. In such moments, we see certain repressive measures taken against Shia believers within the country. Then things calm down, and Iran becomes friendly again.

It’s the same with Russia and with Western countries. These relationships are shaped largely by the subjective interests of the Azerbaijani government. I don’t believe the government will suddenly break off relations with Russia. Even though Russia is weakened, it still poses a serious threat to Azerbaijan.”

Alexander Karavaev, a researcher at the Caspian Institute for Strategic Studies, agrees that Azerbaijan is not aiming to sever ties with the Kremlin, but is instead trying to find a middle ground.

“Broadly speaking, all of Azerbaijan is watching how the president reacts and what steps Baku takes to achieve satisfaction. Public perception of Aliyev’s authority depends on whether he forces Moscow into resolving this situation or whether the uncertainty continues to hang in the air,” Karavaev explained in an interview with Caucasian Knot.

Diplomatic thaw: A shift to a new phase?

Although Azerbaijan’s demands toward Russia were not fully met, tensions between the two countries soon began to ease. The head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced honours for the crew members of the downed aircraft.

In early March, a foundation stone was laid in Moscow for a monument to former president Heydar Aliyev — the father of current Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. On 10 March, Azerbaijani Parliament Speaker Sahiba Gafarova was awarded the Russian Federation’s Order of Friendship.

These developments reflect the contradictions within Azerbaijani-Russian relations — contradictions that do not always escalate into open confrontation, but are instead managed through political rhetoric and symbolic gestures.

With the support of Media Network